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JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE ESSENTIALLY EQUIVALENT
TO A DIVIDEND LANGUAGE UNDER THE 1954
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
BACKGROUND
Adam Smith, in his Wealth of Nations was disposed to consider an un-
certainty in what a person ought to pay in taxation as great an evil as
inequality. 1 If this be a truism, than in no area of the Internal Revenue Code
has this constituted such a reality than corporate distributions which are
subject to the label, "essentially equivalent to a dividend." Over the past
forty years,2 the victims are many who have fallen prey to the virginal inno-
cence of this legislative phrase, which can at best be characterized as blatantly
uncertain. "The development of rules," it was said, "for determining whether
a distribution by a corporation in exchange for part of its outstanding stock is
to be treated as producing dividend income or capital gain or loss to its share-
holders is a most perplexing matter."3 Judge Foley of the District Court for
the Northern District of New York, laboring under the 1939 Code, was less
1 See Nolan, The Uncertain Tax Treatment of Stock Redemptions: A Legislative
Proposal, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 255 (1951). Nolan cites this caveat by Adam Smith, taken
from 3 Smith, Wealth of Nations 257 (5th ed. 1789), in the introductory portion of his
article and then goes on to discuss, in 42 pages, the uncertainty of stock redemption
under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. In conclusion, he states: "We are long past
committed to a highly technical and detailed tax statute, and no section should escape
the degree of specificity reasonably necessary to assure predictable and uniform results."
Id. at 297.
2
 The 'essentially equivalent' language of § 115(g), 1939 Code, first appeared
in the Revenue Act of 1921, as an aftermath of Eisner v. Macomber. On provid-
ing in 1921 that stock dividends would not be taxed on receipt . . Congress
recognized . . . that stock dividends might be issued and then promptly re-
deemed as a substitute for ordinary cash dividends. Congress went on, therefore,
to provide that the redemption of stock 'after the distribution of any such
(stock] dividend' could be taxed as a dividend if the transaction was 'essentially
equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend.' This provision was defec-
tive, however, because it failed to reach a redemption of stock that preceded a
stock dividend; and this omission was corrected in 1924. Two years later, the
provision, which ultimately became § 115(g) of the 1939 Code, was amended to
apply whenever a corporation cancelled or redeemed its stock 'at such time and
in such manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption in
whole or in part essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend,'
whether or not such stock was issued as a stock dividend.
Bittker, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders 209-10 (1959).
3 Cohen, Redemptions of Stock Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 103
U. Pa. L. Rev. 739 (1955).
If a corporation which has earnings or profits distributes cash or other property
to its shareholders without the surrender of stock by the shareholders, it is clear
that they have dividend income which is subject to tax at surtax rates. It is
equally clear that if the shareholders sell their stock to third parties at a profit,
the selling shareholders normally realize capital gain even though the difference
between the sales price and their cost for their stock is due solely to accumulated
earnings in the corporation. But where the shareholder sells his stock back to
the issuing corporation rather than to third parties, there may be difficulty in
determining whether as a practical matter the surrender of the shares is a mean-
ingless gesture or whether it is of such significance as to warrant treating the
Proceeds from the corporation as though they had been received on a sale to
third parties.
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euphemistic. He called it a "nightmarish problem." 4
 Another writer, seeking
solution to the question whether dividend equivalency could ever be averted
when a shareholder parted with less than all of his shares summarized: "This
is the area where some courts adopted the net effect test, others the motive-
for-redemption test, and still others the bona fide partial liquidation test."
His conclusion: "Confusion and uncertainty resulted in all areas."'
As an aftermath of this wholesale puzzling, Congress enacted the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 and codified the uncertainties in this area. So
much so, that Judge Van Oosterhout, who had the opportunity of interpreting
the "essentially equivalent to a dividend" language in one of the first cases to
reach a circuit court under the new code, was prone to remark: "the problem
of statutory construction presented by this appeal has been described as
nightmarish," voicing agreement "that it is very difficult to ascertain from
the provisions of the 1954 Code the precise object which Congress was seek-
ing to accomplish by the changes that it made in existing law."
Planned circuitry? Obviously not And yet, considering the cogent
analysis of one writer in dealing with this problem, such a cynical argument
could well be advanced. He remarked that in applying section 11_5(g) (1), the
essentially equivalent to a dividend language of the 1939 Code, the courts
have consistently stated that the facts of each case must be individually
considered. He continued:
The so-called 'net effect' doctrine came into being when the courts
began saying that whether a cancellation or redemption of stock is
`essentially equivalent' to a taxable dividend depends upon the 'net
effect' of the distribution rather than the motives and plans of the
shareholders of the corporation. About all that can be said today
of the 'net effect' doctrine is that only the effect of the distribution
should be considered without inquiring into the motives for such
distribution. . . . A close study of the decided cases, however, will
indicate that the courts never stopped inquiring into the 'purpose' of
the distributions, they had for consideration . . . More recent
decisions have finally said simply that distributions have the 'net
effect' of dividends if they are 'essentially equivalent' to divi-
dends. . . . In other words, the courts have finally come to realize
that the 'net effect' doctrine added nothing to the words used in the
code.'
Thus, after fourteen years of judicial decision, 8 the application of the
4
 Wilson v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 341, 342 (N.D.N.Y. 1957) and repeated in
United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1958).
5 Murphy, Dividend Equivalency—The End of the Beginning?, 10 Tax L. Rev. 213,
219 (1954).
United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531, 536 (8th Cir. 1961).
7 Jones, How Stock Redemptions Produce Dividend Income, 36 Taxes 437, 438
(1958).
8 The "net effect" doctrine was first enunciated by the late Chief Justice Vinson
when a member of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Flanagan v.
Helvering, 116 F.2d 937, 939-40 (D.C. Cir. 1940). The Fifth Circuit came full circle in
1954 on this problem in stating: " 'Net effect' is a paraphrase for 'essentially equivalent.' "
Commissioner v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 607, 609 (5th Cir. 1954).
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"essentially equivalent to a dividend" language stands divorced of any
definitive guideline.
But to assist Judge Van Oosterhout, surely the what of the matter can
be gleaned from the following Senate Report:
Existing law is complicated by the fact that stock redemptions are
included within the terms of the partial liquidation provisions.°
Thus, a redemption of all of the stock of 1 of 2 sole shareholders of
a corporation may result in capital-gain treatment to the redeemed
shareholder. The result occurs, however, not by reason of the use of
any particular assets of the corporation to effect the redemption but
because the distribution when viewed at the shareholder level is so
disproportionate with respect to the outstanding shareholder in-
terests as not to be substantially equivalent to a dividend.
Your committee, as did the House bill, separates into their signifi-
cant elements the kind of transactions now incoherently aggregated
in the definition of a partial liquidation. Those distributions which
may have capital-gain characteristics because they are not made
pro-rata among the various shareholders would be subjected, at the
shareholder level, to the separate tests described in Part I of this
subchapter. On the other hand, those distributions characterized by
what happens solely at the corporate level by reason of the assets
distributed would be included as within the concept of a partial
liquidation. [Footnote added.]'°
However, the how of the matter is quite another story. Professor Bittker
opines:
The language of the 1954 Code . . . fails hopelessly in its aim of
separating partial liquidations from redemptions. According to Sec-
tion 346(a), a partial liquidation (which is to be treated like a sale
of the surrendered stock) includes a distribution 'in redemption of a
part of the stock of the corporation' that is 'not essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend.' Nothing is said in Section 346(a) about distri-
butions characterized by what happens solely at the corporate level
or about corporate contractions. Yet Section 346 is the section that
is supposed to provide the exclusive rule for partial liquidations,
segregating them from other redemptions. Not only is Section
346(a) innocent of any reference to corporate contractions, but its
language is virtually identical with parts of Section 302, the section
designed by the draftsmen of the 1954 Code to deal exclusively with
those redemptions that are not partial liquidations. For Section 302
provides, among other things, that a redemption shall be treated as
a sale of the stock if it 'is not essentially equivalent to a dividend.'
If the draftsmen's goal of separating into their significant elements
0
 Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, no distinction was made between
partial liquidation and redemption, and in fact partial liquidation was defined "as dis-
tribution by a corporation in complete cancellation or redemption of a part of its
stock" under section 115(i).
'° S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954).
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the kind of transactions incoherently aggregated by the 1939 Code
in the definition of a partial liquidation is achieved, it will be by the
painful process of administrative and judicial construction of muddy
language."
Under the 1939 Code, corporate contraction or legitimate shrinkage was
but a factor in determining dividend equivalency according to section 115.'2
Now, under the 1954 Code, the problem is twofold. Ever present is the per-
plexing problem of determining dividend equivalency 13
 (aided, abetted and
oft times befuddled by the attribution rules of section 318). In addition the
court must distinguish between distributions which originate at the share-
holder level and those at the corporate leve1. 14 In closely held corporations,
where "the shareholder is but the shadow of the corporation" 15 such a de-
termination may well be impossible.
This then is but a very brief history of the "essentially equivalent to a
dividend" language of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. However, in view of
11
 Bittker, Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations Under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 13, 18 (1956). But see Chommie, Section 346(a) (2) :
The Contraction Theory, 11 Tax L. Rev. 407, 413 (1956) where it is pointed out
that the separateness of the two distinct approaches to stock redemption trans-
actions is inferred largely from the Committee Reports; the Code itself is far
from explicit. However, section 331(b), together with the fact that section 302
is contained in Part I of subchapter C dealing with Distributions by Corporations
and section 346 is in Part II dealing with Corporate Liquidations, would seem
to justify the assumption that the courts will take a similar approach.
12
 Treas. Reg. § 29,115-9 (1940). See also, Chommie, supra note 11 at 417,
... all the circumstances were to be considered in determining whether a dis-
tribution in redemption was in partial liquidation or was "essentially equiva-
lent" to a taxable dividend and that corporate contraction was just one of the
many factors to be considered. Even in cases where it was held that contraction
was the dominant factor, the courts were ordinarily careful to point out that the
terms of Section 115(g) (1)—"time" and "manner"—did not permit "definite
rules of construction." The acceptable test was the so-called "net effect" test,
13
 The Senate Reports state that in interpreting the essential equivalent language of
302 and 346, existing laws applies. "The test intended to be incorporated in the interpre-
tation of Paragraph 302(b) (1) is in general that currently employed under Section
115(g) (1) of the 1939 code." S. Rep. No. 1622, 83 Cong., 2d Sess. 234 (1954) ; 3 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 4871 (1954). Section 346(a) "is intended to provide a defini-
tion of partial liquidation which replaces that contained in Section 115(i) of the 1939
Code. Primarily, this definition involves the concept of 'corporate contractions' as de-
veloped under existing law." Id. at 262, 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4899. In
discussing the extent to which 346(a)(2) incorporates prior case law, McDonald, Tax
Considerations in Corporate Divisions: Contraction and Liquidation, 39 Taxes 994
(1961), points out that both Bittker, op. cit. supra note 2, at 216-19 and Chommie, supra
note II, at 425-29, suggest that only "contraction" cases are applicable.
However, Chommie states that one of the most convincing arguments against limit-
ing section 346(a) (2) to corporate contractions is the use of the word "primarily" in the
Senate Report. Ibid. However, "the Senate Report at one point flatly implies that
Section 346(a) is concerned only with redemptions that 'terminate a part of the business
of the corporation.'" Bittker, supra note 11, at 23. But, says Bittker, "primarily" refers
to the entire definition of 346(a), not merely to that part in 346(a) (2). The secondary
implication which Chommie seeks could very well be the type of partial liquidation de-
fined by 346(a) (1) leaving corporate contractions as the sole basis for applying 346(a) (2).
Id. at n.38.
14 Bittker, supra note 11, at 18.
15 Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 113 (1st Cir. 1962).
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its evolution, it seems odd that it should survive in unaltered form. Yet,
clearly it appears from the Senate Reports that Congress in enacting the 1954
Code was familiar with the interpretation given the dividend-equivalent lan-
guage, and from the legislative history as a whole, it equally appears that Con-
gress had no intention of altering the pre-1954 judicial derivations. And in fact,
the criticisms lodged against such language were not only rejected by the
Senate in 1954 but also by the Advisory Group on Subchapter C in 1957 and
the American Law Institute in 1958. This, despite the seemingly infallible
logic of the dissentors."
Nevertheless, however uncertain the past may have been—the question
before us is how great will be the future evils under the 1954 Code? Just
how muddy the language?
The purpose, then, of this commentary is to analyze the developments of
the "essentially equivalent to a dividend" language under the 1954 Code.
SECTION 302(b)(1)
Bradbury v. Commissianern—The First Circuit, in a recent ordinary case,
involving ordinary people and ordinary issues, went to extraordinary lengths
to insure posterity that the skeletons under section 115(g) of the 1939 Code
shall not rest undisturbed. The court, called upon to decide the question
whether the cancellation of petitioner's indebtedness to a corporation and an
additional credit to her account, upon the redemption of forty-four shares of
stock which she held in the corporation, was a distribution essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend within the meaning of section 302 (b) (1), reiterated the time-
worn battle slogans of the 1939 Code in a somewhat stronger tone than the
pre-1954 judiciary would have dared.
From the facts, it appears that at the time of the distribution in question,
petitioner, who organized the L. L. Bradbury Corp. for the purpose of carry-
ing on the lumber manufacturing business, formerly carried on by her deceased
husband, held 177 of the 288 shares of common stock then outstanding. The
remaining stock was held by her daughter (86 shares) and her son-in-law (25
shares). From July 30, 1938, through July 1956, the Bradbury Corporation
continually maintained an "open account" in petitioner's name on its books.
Petitioner as treasurer utilized this drawing account to pay her personal ex-
penses, etc., and all her dividends and salary were credited to this account.
Throughout this period, the account showed a continuous debit balance and
as of July 2, 1956, the date of the distribution, amounted to $21,068.94. The
corporation had a dividend history although no dividends were declared or
paid from 1953 to 1956 inclusive. During this period, cash surplus ranged
from $2,000 to $4,000, earnings and profits were negligible but the corpo-
ration did have accumulated earnings and profits of approximately $50,000.
However, according to the uncontradicted testimony of the company presi-
dent, the petitioner's son-in-law, these were in fixed assets such as timber,
the basis of the business, and obsolete mill buildings that had to be replaced.
16 McDonald, Tax Considerations in Corporate Divisions: Contraction and Liquida-
tion, 39 Taxes 994, 998 (1961).
17 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962).
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Allegedly, this obsolescence precluded effective competition thereby creating a
business crisis.
Faced with the alternatives of modernizing its saw mill operations or
perhaps being forced out of business, the corporation sought a construction
loan from the bank with whom the corporation in the past had frequently
borrowed money to cover operating expenses. The bank officials requested
financial statements and in a subsequent conference with the three share-
holders, informed petitioner that the bank "did not like" the account due
from her and that the petitioner's account should be "cleaned up some way,"
although no specific method of "cleaning up" was mentioned. Thereafter, the
shareholders discussed the matter among themselves, and apparently at Mrs.
Bradbury's suggestion, it was decided that she would transfer forty-four
shares of her stock to the corporation and that her account would be credited
in the amount of $22,489.28. A new financial statement reflecting this trans-
action was presented to the bank and shortly thereafter the construction loan
was granted. Petitioner considered the proceeds as a distribution in full pay-
ment in exchange for the redemption of her stock and reported long term
capital gain. The Commissioner in his notice of deficiency determined that
the taxpayer received a taxable dividend. The tax court, in accord, predicated
"essential equivalence" on the "net effect" of the following factors:
(1) Suggestion of the reduction in capital did not stem from an external
influence, viz., the bank but from the individual shareholders.
(2) The redemption was not motivated by a legitimate corporate busi-
ness purpose since the financial condition did not appear to be
bettered by the redemption nor was the construction loan sub-
stantially larger than prior operating loans.
(3) Petitioner was by far the dominant stockholder.
(4) The corporation had not adopted a plan of contraction nor was
there a contraction of the corporate business.
(5) And at all times, there was sufficient earned surplus to cover the
distribution.
On appeal, the petitioner, challenged generally the tax court's determina-
tion of essential equivalency and specifically the finding that the redemption
was not actuated by a legitimate business purpose. HELD: The net effect of
the cancellation of a major stockholder's indebtedness to the corporation upon
redemption of forty-four shares of stock which because of section 318 effected
no basic change in ownership or control of the corporation amounted to a
distribution essentially equivalent to a dividend even though the redemption
was actuated by the legitimate corporate business purpose of obtaining a
bank loan.
The force of the decision rests on the court's conclusion that the re-
demption was virtually pro rata since the constructive ownership of stock
rules of section 318 attributes the daughter's stock to petitioner. Thus, her
proportionate interest in the corporation before and after the redemption was
substantially unaltered. 18 The court conceded a legitimate business purpose;
recognized that in a proper case, the presence of a legitimate corporate busi-
28 Id. at 117.
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ness purpose may well be relevant as an offsetting factor to a determination
of dividend equivalence but strongly urged that "business purpose" is but one
factor to be considered. Standing alone, it could not be conclusive nor in the
instant case could it be an offsetting factor since here the shareholder was but
the shadow of the corporation. The court reasoned that "in terms of business
purpose, the shareholder cannot realistically be divorced from the board of
directors. It would consequently be unwarranted to turn the presence or
absence of dividend equivalence on a distinction where there is really no
difference." 1°
The decision, as such is not monumental—not a landmark case by any
stretch of the imagination. We have nothing more than a determination of a
"close case"2° based upon a factual inquiry of all attendant circumstances.
Considering the facts in their most favorable light, a determination could
have gone either way. However, since it is one of the early cases to be de-
cided under the "essentially equivalent" language of the 1954 Code and since
it does touch upon a majority of the problems in this area, certain of the
language should be examined.
Strong emphasis was placed on the pro rata nature of the distribution in
determining dividend equivalence. Drawing heavily from their prior decision
in Keefe v. Cote,21 the court stated that pro rata "must be regarded as the
basic criterion" and "must be accorded a pre-eminent position. And, where
. . . present, the record must contain conspicuously countervailing considera-
tions to dispel the aura of dividend equivalence which their presence irresis-
tibly impels. We do not find these countervailing considerations present
here."22
Considering that Cote "actually" owned approximately the same percen-
tage of corporate stock as Bradbury "constructively" owned; that the dis-
tribution in discharge of taxpayer's indebtedness in Cote was held not to be
essentially equivalent to a dividend under section 115(g) because of an over-
riding legitimate corporate business purpose; and that the constructive stock
ownership rules are but one of the facts to be considered in determining
whether a distribution is essentially equivalent to a dividend, 23 perhaps such
language is overly strong and such reliance unjustified. The court talks in
terms of the net effect of attendant circumstances yet premises all of these
circumstances upon a single base—the attribution rules of section 318. Ac-
cordingly, petitioner was considered the dominant or virtually sole stockholder
which enabled the court to find a pro rata distribution; to find that the pe-
titioner's interest in the corporation was substantially unaltered by the re-
demption; to further find that the legitimate corporate business purpose could
not be a vital consideration since the shareholder was but the shadow of the
corporation. This snow-balling result is inconsistent with the court's own
19 Id. at 118. ". . . a business-purpose test is often no more than the statement of
a conclusion, especially in the close corporation context where shareholder and corporate
motives are almost merged." Gratch, How to Redeem a Shareholder's Stock, 39 Taxes,
169, 177 (1961).
20 Supra note 17, at 118.
21
 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954).
22 Supra note 17, at 116-17.
23 Treas. Reg.
	
1.302-2(b) (1955),
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interpretation of "net effect" for said the court: "The so-called net effect
test is not a weighted formula by which to solve the issue before the court.
The net effect of the transaction is not evidence or testimony to be con-
sidered; it is an inference to be drawn or a conclusion to be reached." 24 From
the over-emphasized pro rata effect of the distribution and the total disregard
of the regulations25 which state that attribution rules are but a factor to be
considered, could such a proper conclusion be reached? Query then whether
the court was not in fact guilty of what it was in fact condemning?
Furthermore, it is possible to take issue with the court's very interpreta-
tion of "net effect" which it borrowed from the Sullivan case,26 decided in the
Fifth Circuit in 1954, because in the later case of Cobb v. Callan Court Co., 27
also of the Fifth Circuit, the court reasoned:
In this case we find perhaps more of the factors lending weight on
one side or the other of the balance, than are present in most of
such cases. For the most part the factors, both in numbers and im-
portance, are on the side of Callan. The determination of the dis-
24
 Supra note 17, at 115; citing Commissioner v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 607, 609 (5th
Cir. 1954). If certain criteria are "basic" and must be afforded a pre-eminent position,
obviously they must be given additional weight or emphasis. Does this not imply a
weighted test?
Without attempting to reargue the case, certain factors did not seem to receive their
due emphasis—if in fact a net-effect test leading to a conclusion rather than a weighted
test was to be followed. The bank examined the balance sheet and refused the loan with
the item "Due from officer" representing the accumulated debt of petitioner. Petitioner
did not have funds to pay the debt. The corporation had practically no cash surplus with
which to pay a dividend whereby petitioner could acquire funds to satisfy her debt. At
a meeting, variously termed, of the officers, the shareholders or the individuals, all being
the same, the redemption of stock was devised as a matter of "cleaning up" the financial
statement, which as revised, was accepted by the bank and the loan granted. Personal
advantage to petitioner was in issue, but considering that the petitioner was 68 years old
at the time of the transaction, and had been transferring her stock periodically since
1949 to her daughter and son-in-law intending that they should eventually have full con-
trol of the stock, it might well be that she incurred a detriment. In fact, after discussions
extending from 1950 through 1957, petitioner, in February 1958, transferred all her re-
maining stock to them in return for their note. Thus, to redeem her stock, she obligated
herself to a tax liability which she had no need to incur and for which she testified, and
her children both concurred, there was no known personal reason nor advantage (Peti-
tioner's Brief, pp. 5-10). But for the business purpose, there would have been no re-
demption. Further, as we have seen, if the transaction were considered a "sale" then capi-
tal gains treatment would follow. When the sale is to a third party, the transaction has
all the indications of a sale, but when the buyer is the corporation, the exact nature be-
comes somewhat clouded. But here we may speculate. Was there time for such a sale
to a third party? In view of the fact that no dividends were paid during the past three
years, and future dividends were questionable because of their present business crisis,
plans for reconstruction etc., would there even be a buyer? Thus, motivated by a legiti-
mate business purpose, the corporation purchased the stock—not only to expedite the
loan but to retain the stock in the closely held family corporation. The jury in Cote had
far less to work with in finding an overriding business purpose, and thus a distribution
within the meaning of section 302(b) (1), than did the court in the instant case. Nor
was it any comfort to Bradbury that the case was "close." A taxpayer is in no position
to average out his losses, nor should the law compel such an attempt.
25 Supra note 23.
20 Supra note 24.
27 274 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1960).
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trict court that the • • redemption was not essentially equivalent to
a taxable dividend is clearly not erroneous. 28
Certainly, this is a weighted formula test—the same test that the Brad-
bury court rejected in theory but applied in fact. However, the point of the
matter is that both Sullivan and Callan Court Co. were decided under the
1939 Code where uncertainty was more the rule than the exception, and so
long as the determination of net effect is unsettled in the Fifth Circuit, its
value as precedent remains highly suspect. Bradbury, since it was a case of
first impression in the First Circuit under the 1954 Code, should not the court
have tried to set precedence rather than rely on it? In view of the turbulent
history of the "essentially equivalent" language under the 1939 Code?
Whether or not a "legitimate corporate business purpose" will ever
amount to a "conspicuously countervailing consideration" in the First Cir-
cuit, and elsewhere, as a matter of precedence, is placed squarely in doubt by
the Bradbury language. The court cites United States v. Fewell,2° for the
true rule that a single bona fide corporate purpose (improving the credit
standing of the corporation) will not standing alone conclusively prevent a de-
termination of dividend equivalence. But this begs the question. Since we
are in an area of factual inquiry, any true rule is unrealistic. Any redemption
or purchase of stock is necessarily predicated upon a number of factors, all
of which, regardless of the language of the court, are considered in determin-
ing whether the distribution is essentially equivalent to a dividend. Further-
more, the court was called upon to decide whether section 302(b) (1) was
properly applied to the facts of the case, 3° not whether or not the distribution
was prompted by a legitimate corporate business purpose "standing alone."
But even if that was the precise issue before the court, the Senate Report
does not foreclose the possibility of finding for the taxpayer:
The test intended to be incorporated in the interpretation of para-
graph [302(b)] (1) is in general that currently employed under
Section 115(g) (1) of the 1939 Code. Your committee further in-
tends that in applying this test for the future that the inquiry will
be devoted solely to the question of whether or not the transaction
by its nature may properly be characterized as a sale of stock by
the redeeming shareholder to the corporation 3 1 [Emphasis sup-
plied.]
Moreover, Fewell is distinguishable in that the court reversed and re-
manded because of erroneous instructions which presented the jury with an
alternative of finding either essentially equivalent to a dividend or a corporate
business purpose—no mention was made of net effect. Since the net effect
test was utilized in both Cote and Bradbury, they appear more compatible
and perhaps should have been so considered. Thus, the use of Fewell to
dilute petitioner's argument of legitimate corporate business purpose, as found
28 Id. at 538.
29 255 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1958).
X Id. at 498.
S. Rep. No. 1622, 83 Cong., 2d Sess. 234 (1954) ; 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
4870 (1954) (Detailed Discussion of Bill).
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in Cote, might well be the type of muddy language Professor Bittker had in
mind. This in fact is the general criticism of Bradbury. Considering we have
a factual inquiry of a "close case," it is difficult to quarrel with the result. But
because of these same circumstances, the overpowering use of language and
the anxious clinging to pre-1954 Code cases cannot be condoned.
In any event, if the sagging guide lines of the 1939 Code are to be
avoided, it will be incumbent upon the courts, deciding the early cases like
Bradbury, to insure that their opinions are replete with sound reasoning and
proper analysis. Prior precedent should be used with an eye to the future—
discriminately, so as to insure some degree of predictability or certainty.
Otherwise, the essentially equivalent language of the 1954 Code may direct
itself more to tax entrapment than to discouraging tax avoidance.
Neff v. United States22—Following on the heels of Bradbury, the oscillating
course of this decision clearly exemplifies not only the uncertainty in applying
302(b) (1), but more importantly, affords us a glimpse of the extremes to
which the "essentially equivalent" language may propel a court.
Neff, for tax purposes, was the sole shareholder of a corporation whose
authorized capital consisted of 500 shares of common stock. Of the 100
shares issued and outstanding—ninety-nine shares were owned by Neff and
the remaining share by his wife. To raise additional capital needed to profit-
ably operate the business, the corporation redeemed forty-seven of plaintiff's
shares in exchange primarily for the cancellation of his indebtedness. Within
a year, thirty-eight of these shares had been sold at a substantial profit. The
Commissioner considered the corporate distribution and cancellation of in-
debtedness essentially equivalent to a dividend and taxable as ordinary in-
come. In a suit for refund, Neff argued that the government's assessment
was in error because the redemption was undertaken exclusively for a legiti-
mate corporate business purpose to raise corporate capital and that as a result
of the redemption and subsequent sale of thirty-eight shares by the corpora-
tion, his proportionate interest in the corporation had been substantially
altered. HELD: Redemption from a corporation's sole shareholder of stock
which the corporation later resells to third parties at a substantial profit to
raise needed operating capital is a distribution not essentially equivalent to a
dividend.
Judge Durfee, dissenting, considered the net effect of the redemption as
a pro rata distribution of earnings and profits. He reasoned that if the cor-
poration needed more capital it could have issued additional of the 400
authorized but unissued shares and sold these in precisely the same manner.
He stated further:
the assets of the company would have remained intact prior to the
sale, the total assets would have been enlarged by an identical
amount of new capital from the sale and Neff's proportionate owner-
ship in the corporation would have been altered to a degree sub-
stantially equivalent to the change that resulted from the transaction
as it actually occurred. . . . It appears to me that in reaching a
32 301 F.2d 330 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
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contrary result the majority has overlooked entirely the realities of
the closely held—or in this case, single-owner corporation."
Judge Darr, in a concurring dissent, was equally aroused but reached his
conclusion on more pragmatic grounds:
As stated in the majority opinion, immediately before the redemp-
tion the corporation needed ... capital; could not borrow . . . from
the banks; and no purchaser would buy stock from Mr. Neff. Ob-
viously the stock had no market value before the redemption. The
amount paid to Mr. Neff for the stock would not fix the market
value. Therefore, the only criterion for the value of the stock is the
book value which was said to be $852.47 per share. However, this
includes the $19,035 received by Mr. Neff as an asset. Assuming
that this amount was a dividend, the book value of each share of
the corporation's stock was $662.12. . . . Before the redemption Mr.
Neff's 99 shares at book value were worth $65,549.88 and after the
completion of the redemption plan his 52 shares at book value were
worth $109,386.16. The result is that Mr. Neff's remaining 52
shares of stock after the redemption plan was completed were worth
$43,836.28 more than his 99 shares of stock before the redemption.
It might also be noted that after the redemption plan, Mr. Neff
still remained in control of the corporation . . . $19,035 to the
good ..34
In view of the persuasive reasoning of the dissentors, it is difficult to reconcile
the court's application of section 302 (b) (1). The majority's main point of
contention was that the redemption and subsequent sale substantially altered
Neff's proportionate interest in the corporation. His stock ownership was
reduced from ninety-nine per cent to fifty-six per cent. "The fact that the
resale was accomplished over a period of some 9 to 12 months . . . would not
change the complexion of the transaction," said the court."
Although these facts imply an application of the substantially dispro-
portionate redemption of stock provisions of section 302(b) (2), the court
expressly disclaimed any such reliance in view of the "immediately after the
redemption" language of that subsection. A further justification, although
not mentioned by the court, was the fact that the taxpayer did not own less
than fifty per cent of the total combined voting power after the redemption
as required by section 302(b) (2) (B). Despite the above, the court extended
the scope of this disproportionate redemption test by using it as the determinant .
for judging dividend equivalence under section 302(b) (1). The language in
the Senate Report certainly opens the door to such a conclusion36 but in so
finding here:
33 Id. at 334.
34 Id. at 335.
35 Id. at 332.
36 Infra note 41. See Treas. Reg. supra note 23, and Gratch, How to Redeem a
Shareholder's Stock, 39 Taxes 169, 178 (1961) where the writer believes that section
302(b) (1) should be extended to cover a "bona fide attempt to meet the requirements
of the specific tests of section 302 (b) (2) or (3) which fail because of some technical over-
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the court had to make the unwarranted assumption that the redemp-
tion and consequent change in proportionate holdings were so closely
related that they should be treated as steps in the same transaction.
It has been suggested that the proper test in such a situation is
whether the steps 'were so interdependent that the legal relations
created by one transaction would have been fruitless without a com-
pletion of the series.' There is little indication in this case that the
subsequent sale was so closely related to the redemption as to justify
its inclusion in that transaction."
As argued by the taxpayer, the legitimate corporate business purpose was the
coalescing factor. Unfortunately, as the dissent pointed out, a finding of a
legitimate corporate business purpose is the most dubious part of the entire
transaction, and on motion for reconsideration of the original decision, the
case was reargued."
Judge Durfee, this time writing for the majority, reversed on essentially
the same argument advanced by his prior dissent incorporating Judge Darr's
analysis to buttress his finding that the distribution was essentially equivalent
to a taxable dividend. Added emphasis was given the fact that the taxpayer's
proportionate interest in the corporation was not altered immediately after
the redemption and in fact resembled a pro rata distribution constituting a
dividend .2°
The reason for reversal was attempted by Judge Whitaker in a con-
curring opinion:
I concurred in the former opinion because I thought we should
compare Neff's relationship to the corporation before the redemption
with his relationship after all sales of his stock had been made. I
am afraid this ignores the provision of section 302, that the com-
parison must be made between the situation before and 'immediately
after the redemption.'"
As in Bradbury, considering the overall atmosphere of the decision, it
may be difficult to quarrel with reversal in this case but considering the
language, it is certain that the court was unwisely exercising judicial liberty.
Both Judges Durfee and Whitaker have ingrafted a requirement onto
sight or some very indirect attribution of ownership"; Rev. Rul. 55-462, 1955-2 Cum.
Bull. 221 where a redemption was held to qualify under section 302(b) (1) although it
was not "substantially disproportionate" under section 302(b) (2). The IRS noted that
"in the instant case, the transaction . .. by its nature can be characterized as a sale by
the shareholder. The two shareholders are unrelated and there is no pro rata distribu-
tion in whole or part affected by the transaction."
37
 Note, 48 Va. L. Rev. 1171, 1175 (1962).
38
 Neff v. United States, 305 F.2d 455 (Ct. Cl. 1962). Prior decision, supra note 32,
vacated and withdrawn.
39
 In dealing with legitimate corporate business purpose, Durfee stated, "We do not
believe that the presence of such corporate purpose establishes per se non-equivalence."
Id. at 457. This is a much more conservative statement of the rule than that contained
in the Bradbury case and would appear to be more consistent with the legislative intent
and far more helpful in establishing future guidelines.
40 Supra note 38, at 459. Sec the discussion in Decker v. Commissioner, infra note
69, a case which repels such a conclusion.
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302(b) (1) that in determining dividend equivalency—we must consider the
transaction immediately after the distribution. True, in applying the me-
chanical tests of 302(b) (2) and (3), "immediately after" is a legislative re-
quirement but (b) (1) is void of such language. As a matter of statutory
construction, it would appear that it was the manifest intent of Congress not
to so restrict 302 (b) (1).
This was the crux of Judge Laramore's dissent in the instant decision.
He stressed the fact that the Senate Report calls for a "factual inquiry 7411 in
determining the present question; that Mr. Neff's proportionate ownership
was diminished per force of the sale and that the nine to twelve month period
necessary to complete the sale should not alter the situation because of the
difficulty in marketing the stock. He raised this same argument writing for
the majority in the prior decision and his interpretation of the Senate Report
and scope of 302 (b) (1) went unquestioned. There, the dissent attacked the
so-called legitimate corporate business purpose, both Judges Durfee and Darr
stressing issuance of additional stock as the proper solution, not redemption.
This they believed merely aggravated the capital crisis. Yet, in defense of the
prior decision, it should be noted that if, as Judge Darr stated, no buyer
would purchase from Neff, how could the corporation hope to sell the stock?
Neff and the corporation were one and the same! The answer must lie in the
fact that prospective buyers were less reluctant after Neff decreased his hold-
ings. If the redemption was the inducement, then Neff's legitimate corporate
business purpose argument takes on added significance. Surely we cannot
divorce ourselves from the fact that had Neff sold his stock to the subsequent
buyers in his own name rather than in the name of the corporation, no divi-
dend tax would have been assessed. Also, if the 100 shares issued and out-
standing represented the authorized capital of the corporation, a second hard
look at Judge Laramore's argument would be necessary. However, the
amount of stock authorized should not have been emphasized as much as it
was. The statutory procedure for additional authorization is relatively simple,
especially in a one man corporation.
In view of the above reasoning, Judge Durfee's request that we look at
the realities of the closely held corporation presents somewhat of an anomaly.
Moreover, considering some of Durfee's language, this writer urges that we
look also at the realities of statutory construction.
United States v. Carey42—This case represents the first interpretation of the
essentially equivalent language of the 1954 Code. 43 It should, therefore,
preface any discussion of section 302(b) (1). It should, that is, but for the
result!
The case involved a two-man corporation, Carey-Brown Motors Inc., in
which each stockholder was the record owner of 300 shares. During a period
41 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 233 (1954), in discussing subsection (b)
of section 302, states: "In lieu of the approach in the House, your committee intends
to revert in part to existing law by making the determination of whether a redemption
is taxable as a sale at capital gains rates or as a dividend at ordinary income rates
dependent, except where it is specifically provided otherwise, upon a factual inquiry."
42 289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961).
43
 Id. at 536-37.
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of increasing business activity, Brown, unable to devote time to the business,
decided to terminate his interest. This would require a buyer with $50,000
and a personal interest in the automobile business. Larson, a present em-
ployee was the only such purchaser to be found but unfortunately, he had but
$22,000. Thus to effect the sale in the best interests of the business, the
following plan was agreed upon: (1) A pro rata redemption by the corpora-
tion from each shareholder of 145 shares by a transfer to them of the corpor-
ate buildings and book accounts; (2) followed by a lease-back to the
corporation of the buildings for a period of three years; (3) a sale by Brown
to Carey of two shares and to Larson, the remaining 153 (purchase price was
$22,239); (4) a change in corporate name to Carey-Larson Motors Inc.; (5)
election of Larson as treasurer; and (6) complete severence of Brown's
interest in the corporation.
The tax court considered the redemption and reduction of the capital
structure to be a necessary expedient in meeting the unexpected business
crisis and thus, a distribution within the meaning of section 302(b) (1). The
Government appealed on a claim of error in interpreting the essentially
equivalent language of the Code. HELD: In applying the established criteria
of the 1939 Code for determining dividend equivalency to the facts as found
by the trial court, the conclusion that the redemption when viewed at the
stockholder level under section 302 is not essentially equivalent to a dividend,
cannot be reversed since there is substantial evidentiary support. Nor was it
shown that it was induced by an erroneous view of the law.
The court basically resorted to a net effect test" in reviewing the six-
step transaction, the specific nature of which, for present purposes of dis-
cussion, is of little importance. The significant feature of the decision is the
scope of review enunciated by the court for it clearly establishes a proper
guide-line for future decisions. As a matter of speculation, query whether
Bradbury could have been decided by a mere per curiam reciting the instant
case. Certainly, the application of Carey would have obviated the lengthy
and questionable discussion of the many reasons for affirmance—all factual
in nature. All too often, facts can be cast in different light to produce differ-
ent inferences, the result of which may tend to "muddy" rather than en-
lighten judicial expression. Where the court feels that the moving party has
not sustained its burden of proof—where they fail to show that the finding
below was unsupported by substantial evidence or was induced by an errone-
ous view of the law—a commentary on the area of law as in Bradbury adds
nothing to the decision and may in fact, result in dicta unduly restricting the
future application of present criteria.
Despite the above, the Carey result is difficult to accept. True the
Government did not question the capital gains treatment afforded Brown
because of the termination of his interest; however, considering the termina-
tion of interest provision of section 302(b) (3), the facts would admit of no
other conclusion. But continued the court, "the stock redemption as to
44
 The court in stating that net effect is at least a factor implies that it was
applying a slightly different net-effect test than that resorted to under the 1439 Code.
This would seem to equate net effect with some other equally important factors. In
application, however, the tenor of the decision reflects a general net effect approach—
considering all factors.
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Brown and Carey was made as a result of the same identical corporate action
and for the same business purpose. If there was no pro rata distribution to
Brown, there could be no pro rata distribution to Carey."48
 This is an ob-
vious non sequitur. In the first place the better rule is that the pro rata
nature of the distribution is but a factor in dividend equivalency." Secondly,
the case is severely criticized and on a very sound basis; 47
 Judge J. Spencer
Bell classifying the redemption as part of a broader plan and conceding
capital gains treatment to the withdrawing shareholder, questioned the cor-
rectness of affording capital gains treatment to the shareholder remaining in
the business. "Since he was to be the sole owner of the corporation, the re-
demption of a part of his stock, being unessential to the effectuation of the
plan . . . should have been viewed as being a pro rata distribution and equiv-
alent to a dividend." 48
 There is no valid reason why a legitimate corporate
business purpose characteristic of Brown's redemption should sweep in the
redemption of Carey's stock merely because in point of time, they were
similar.
. It is interesting to note that Brown could have simply redeemed all of
his 300 shares at capital gains rates under 302 (b) (3) and Carey could have
then sold 153 of his shares to Larson, accomplishing the same result and
avoiding the entire problem. Obviously, Carey wanted a slice of the accumu-
lated profits. This the court ignored in finding an overall corporate plan to
reduce the outstanding stock to a level which would allow Larson to purchase
and which would thus benefit all concerned.
Perhaps the court's justification is that since the above transaction could
have resulted in capital gains treatment, the situation did not really involve
an attempt to get profits out but rather a valid business purpose to shift
stock ownership in the best interests of the corporation. If this was the case,
it's unfortunate that the court did not clearly express its reasoning for this is
45
 Supra note 42, at 539.
45
 This is a debatable point, but the growing emphasis afforded a legitimate cor-
porate business purpose sustains this approach. See the analysis in Ballenger v. United
States, 301 F.2d 192, 196-98 (4th Cir. 1962), discussed in text following note 49 infra;
Bradbury v. Commissioner, supra note 17, at 117 (dictum) (pro rata distribution not
conclusive evidence); and the treatment by Bittker, op. cit. supra note 2, at 232-34.
The regulations under § 302(b) (I) state that if a corporation has only one class
of stock outstanding, a pro rata redemption "generally" will be treated as a dis-
tribution under § 301. . . No doubt many fervent arguments will be based on
the term "generally," in an effort to protect some pro rata redemptions against
§ 301 by bringing them under the aegis of § 302(b)(1).
Id. at 233.
But the Senate Report ... rather clearly implies that § 302 is concerned solely
with 'those distributions which may have capital-gain characteristics because they
are not made pro rata among the various shareholders.. . .' It is not easy to give
§ 302(b) (I) an expansive construction in view of . . . [the] indication that its
major function was the narrow one of immunizing redemptions of minority hold-
ings of preferred stock.
Id. at 232. See also Rev. Rul. 56-182, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 157 holding that a redemption
of some of the stock of a majority shareholder to enable an employee to increase his
holdings under an earlier stock option agreement is "essentially equivalent to a dividend"
-because it did not produce an appreciable change in position of the parties involved.
47 Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962).
48 Id. at 197 n.10.
701
11U.IF n11111.im,y..
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
a much more liberal approach to the problem than is evidenced by prior or
subsequent cases. The court is permitting a legitimate business purpose to
prevail despite a concurrent tax avoidance motive.
Ballenger v. United States44—Judge J. Spencer Bell, in a very informative
opinion, attempted to shape the course of events taken by the essentially
equivalent language of the 1954 Code. Regarding the issue as factual in
nature he paraphrased the scope of review enunciated in Carey as involving
two questions: (1) whether the court below applied the correct criteria for
determining dividend equivalency and (2) whether the findings of fact were
supported by substantial evidence? "With the possible exception of the Ninth
Circuit," he said, "every court of appeals appears to be in agreement. . . ." 5°
In applying section 302 (b) (1), he noted that the cases are viewed solely
from the shareholder's perspective and that two distinct lines of cases appear.
The first applies a "strict 'net effect' test" and the second, a net effect test
but with a further consideration, i.e., whether or not there are legitimate busi-
ness purposes for the redemption. His interpretation of net effect, considering
the verbiage of Bradbury and like decisions, is certainly a rose among thorns.
He states:
Under this test, the court must hypothesize a situation where the
corporation did not redeem any stock, but instead declared a divi-
dend for the same amount. The court then must examine the situa-
tion after the dividend and compare it with the actual facts of the
case when stock was redeemed, viewed always from the shareholders'
vantage point. The redemption is essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend if the results from the hypothetical dividend and the actual
stock redemption are essentially the same. _ 5 '
It is submitted that this test as stated would have greatly facilitated the
Neff result for basically the case was decided on the fact that no business
purpose was served by redeeming his stock, and absent such a finding, the
results from a hypothetical dividend and the actual stock redemption were
essentially the same. It would also have given very definite meaning to the
Bradbury definition of net effect, to the extent that the court equated net
effect with "an inference to be drawn or a conclusion to be reached." 52
In applying the Ballenger test, the court considered certain pertinent
factors: (1) whether the same shareholders would have received the identical
payments had the redemption been a dividend (in Neff, yes; in Bradbury,
perhaps not, if her son-in-law's testimony is to be believed); (2) whether
the redemption altered the shareholders' control over the corporation and
4D Supra note 47.
50
 Id. at 196. He notes that both cases in the Ninth Circuit which have taken a
contrary view, Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp, v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1957)
and Earle v. Woodlaw, 245 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1957), have a dissenting opinion. See
generally Ballenger v. United States, supra note 47, at 196 n.8 for a breakdown by
circuits. For our purposes, consider the fact that both of these cases were decided under
the 1939 Code. Perhaps the court will reappraise the situation when faced with a 1954
Code decision.
51 Id. at 196.
52 See notes 23 to 28 supra and accompanying text.
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their respective rights to its future earnings (emphatically yes in Neff since
he was the sole stockholder and likewise in Bradbury to the extent that a
majority shareholder controls the corporation); (3) whether the redemption
is part of a broader plan (this precludes incorporation of the term "immedi-
ately after" into 302(b) (1) as attempted in Neff—further the "broader
plan" factor should be cautiously applied in view of the instant court's criti-
cism of Carey which was decided on this broader plan basis).
The court avoids any lengthy discussion of pro rata as in Bradbury by
establishing almost a conclusive presumption that "every pro rata redemption
will be equivalent to a dividend, for in no way can it result in any alteration
in the relationship of the shareholders, both with respect to their share of
the distribution in question and in respect to future control and profits."53
As to the second line of cases, the court stresses that a business purpose
is not restricted to purposes which insure successful operation of the business.
"Personal business affairs of the shareholders also warrant attention," e.g.,
Carey where the redemption was supposedly part and parcel of a share-
holder's complete withdrawal from the business. As evidenced by the Carey
case, this is difficult to apply and Judge Bell quickly added that "of course,
an acceptable business purpose can never be reducing income taxes for the
purpose of the statute is to prevent distribution . . . at the lower capital
gains rate."54 As a practical matter, this differentiation between corporate
and personal business affairs may tend to confuse more than to enlighten for
it has been suggested that the courts are losing sight of the proper meaning
of business purpose:
The utilization of business purpose by many of the courts—and by
the way it is used by the Internal Revenue Service today—is a far
cry from the business purpose doctrine developed in Gregory v. Hel-
vering.'" In the Gregory case, `1Susiness purpose' . . . referred
to the corporate reality of the transaction in terms of the statutory
53 Supra note 47, at 197. Bittker is in complete accord for his position is that
section 302(b)(1) can apply only to non pro rata redemptions. The Taxation of Stock
Redemptions and Partial Liquidations, 44 Cornell L.Q. 299, 322 -25 (1959).
54 Supra note 47, at 197.
55 293 U.S. 465 (1935). The Supreme Court held that full compliance with the
letter of the spin-off statute was not enough if the transaction was otherwise indistinguish-
able from an ordinary dividend. The taxpayer was the sole stockholder of A corpora-
tion which held, among its assets, 1000 shares of B corporation. These taxpayer wished
to sell to a third party, thus she caused C corporation to be organized, transferred this
stock to C corporation in consideration for which C corporation issued all of its stock
to the taxpayer. A few days later, C corporation was dissolved, its assets distributed to
taxpayer who then sold them to the third party, The Commissioner determined a defi-
ciency on the theory that the net result was an ordinary dividend distribution of the
assets by A corporation to the taxpayer, and that the "reorganization" provisions should
not be confined to transactions having some purpose other than tax avoidance. The tax
court held for the taxpayer. The Second Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court affirmed:
The whole undertaking was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance
masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else. The rule which
excludes from consideration the motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the
situation, because the transaction upon its face lies outside the plain intent of
the statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and to de-
prive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose.
Id, at 470.
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purpose. . . . [A]n analysis of Helvering v. Gregory shows that
there was no reality in the situation, and to many of us that's all
`business purpose' means today. Is there reality? Is what is ac-
complished a reality, and have we done what we sought to do?
[Footnote added.] 6 °
"Purity of motive" is another business purpose factor which in turn
compels an inquiry into whether the redemption initiated with the share-
holders or the corporation; whether the corporation had been declaring ade-
quate dividends; and whether there were "in fact" corporate earnings and
profits. Query whether in fact means available for distribution? If this be
the proper interpretation, reconsider the facts in Bradbury: a corporation
in critical need of capital, little cash on hand, threatened by severe compe-
tition, accumulated earnings and profits tied up in fixed assets necessary for
the continuation of the business, no money changed hands, merely a paper
entry--yet the distribution was essentially equivalent to a dividend. Much
was made of the accumulated earnings and profits but were these in fact
corporate earnings and profits?"
At any rate, courts following the second approach find the shareholder-
corporate officer sameness in close corporations to be a very real obstacle in
untangling the various purposes. The court noted that "recourse in such
circumstances should be to the factors emphasizing the net effect of the
transaction if the statute is to be reasonably applied."" This seems to say
that when incisive distinctions cannot be made as to who initiated the dis-
tribution, the shareholder or the corporation, the over-riding business purpose
factor should not be considered. Keefe v. Cote" is consistent with this
proposition but this same court in Bradbury was not prone to permit repe-
tition and accordingly, included this factor on the dividend equivalency side
of the balance (or drew an inference in favor of a dividend depending upon
your choice of interpreting the court's use of net effect).
"The only difference then between the two lines of cases is that courts
following the first will tax as a dividend any redemption for which tax
avoidance is likely to be a motivating factor, while courts adhering to the
58
 Substance v. Form in Corporate Activities—A Series of Panel Discussions, N.Y.U.
20th Inst. on Fed. Tax 975, 979 (1962).
157
 Judge Phillips, dissenting in World Publishing Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d
186 (10th Cir. 1948), argued in a similar vein, while protesting to the assessment of an
accumulated earnings tax. In rejecting the notion that the corporation should have dis-
tributed the earnings as dividends he stated:
Surely, a business enterprise, with obsolete and badly worn equipment, might,
during the War period, legitimately set aside a reserve fund to replace that
equipment, when available, and to construct the building necessary to house
such equipment. To do so would be ordinary business prudence.
Id. at 192. Thus the analogy may be drawn that Bradbury, unable to meet competition,
was in no position to distribute fixed assets necessary for the continuation of the busi-
ness by way of dividends. This would be imprudent. Consequently, the corporation did
not in fact have earnings and profits available for distribution.
58 Supra note 47, at 198.
59 213 F.2d 651, 657 (1st Cir. 1954) (legitimate business purpose prevailed over a
pro rata redemption where the court admitted that they could not distinguish between
"stockholder-taxpayer and principal if not as a practical matter the only corporate
officer , „").
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second line of cases adopt a more flexible approach, by some times permit-
ting a legitimate business purpose to prevail despite a concurrent tax avoid-
ance motive."°°
However, in deciding the case at hand, the court found it unnecessary
to make such an election for either choice would compel an affirmance of the
district court's finding of dividend equivalency. The facts are these. The
corporation was organized in 1949 with common and preferred stock issued-
to all stockholders which preferred, plaintiffs contend, was issued for a valid
business purpose; "to prevent the liquidation of the business upon the death
of one of its partners." In 1953 a resolution was adopted by the corporation
calling for liquidation of all the stock both common and preferred held by all
parties other than the taxpayers. These resolutions referred to the trans-
action as a partial liquidation. They made no reference to retirement of tax-
payers' stock, either preferred or common. However, plaintiffs argue that
when the stock of all other shareholders was redeemed, the reasons for is-
suing preferred stock ceased to exist and this in itself constituted a valid
business reason for subsequently redeeming their preferred stock. The lower
court termed the distribution essentially equivalent to a dividend grounded
on the fact that the corporation had never paid a dividend on the common
stock; that the corporation had liquid earnings and profits in excess of the
distribution; and that stock ownership and voting control of the corporation
were not changed by the retirement.
-	
Judge Bell, speaking for the majority on appeal, reached the same result
but in a much easier fashion. Viewing the facts under a strict net effect test,
because the distribution was pro rata, the court's virtual res ipsa doctrine
created a burden of proof that the plaintiffs could not sustain.
Nor would the result be any different, reasoned the court, if the test
of an over-riding legitimate corporate business purpose were followed for "we
cannot understand how a valid reason for the issuance of preferred stock can,
once its purposes have been served, be converted into a reason for its redemp-
tion. Even if it had been originally understood that the preferred stock
would eventually be redeemed, such a fact is not, without more, a legitimate
business justification."°'
In negatively defining what the court considers to be a legitimate business
purpose, the court seems to require that the transaction alleviate a business
crisis. Perhaps rightly so for if the transaction is to over-ride a dividend
finding under a strict net effect test, it should amount to something more
than ordinary corporate activity. Support for this contention is provided by
Judge Bell in the manner in which he distinguishes two 1939 Code cases. 02
In both cases, as he points out, "the courts found a legitimate business pur-
pose in the redemption of stock, the issuance of which had been justifiable,
because at that time, it was understood that the stock would eventually be
redeemed." However, "we cannot follow these cases because we can see no
6° Supra note 58.
61 Supra note 47, at 199.
62 Cobb v. Callan Court Co., 274 F.2d 532, 538 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Keefe v. Cote, 213
F.2d 651, 657 (1st Cir. 1954).
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business purpose here, apart from the avoidance of taxes, advanced by the
redemption." 63
In one case, the redemption was in cancellation of an indebtedness owing
to the taxpayer and carried on the corporate books because its existence re-
flected adversely on the corporation's credit standing." In the other, the
redemption of preferred from the dominant shareholder was pursuant to a
plan of reorganization following bankruptcy. The corporation was indebted
to the taxpayer; initially satisfied the debt by issuing him common and
second mortgage bonds; but later cancelled the bonds and issued preferred
in order to improve the fiscal position of the new company and reduce the
amount of the fixed interest charges. At the time of the transaction, it was
agreed that the corporation would redeem the preferred as soon as it was in
a position to do so." Thus, it can be seen that in both cases, the redemption
was the result of sound but ordinary corporate activity. True, both share-
holder and corporation benefited but there was no urgency associated with
the redemption and as in the Neff case, there were alternative methods avail-
able which would bring about the same result. It is submitted that the
Bradbury "business purpose" is what the court has in mind; the immediacy
of the redemption to satisfy a corporate purpose where alternative solutions
are either lacking or impractical.
Thomas Kerrm—Petitioner was the sole stockholder of two independent cor-
porations, Helix Milling Co. and Kerr-Grain Corporation. Because the milling
business necessitated a steady line of bank credit and because his bank talked
of "certain advantages—both credit-wise and tax-wise," petitioner transferred
his Kerr-Grain stock to Helix for $50,000. The Commissioner considered the
transaction a section 304(a) (1) redemption, 66° thus treating the proceeds as a
taxable dividend over the petitioner's claim of 302 (b) (1).
In deciding the issue of dividend equivalency, the court applied Judge
Bell's "strict net-effect" test" and sustained the deficiency assessment. Kerr,
63
 Supra note 47, at 199 n.21.
64
 Keefe v. Cote, supra note 62. The stock was originally given to the taxpayer in
settlement of his claim for salary, the purpose of the exchange of the stock for the note
being a corporate one, i.e., to improve the corporation's credit. Thus it could be found
that there was a corporate purpose in issuing the shares and it also could be found that
they were redeemed in carrying out that corporate purpose and the jury so found.
65
 Cobb v. Callan Court Co., supra note 62.
66
 38 T.C. No. 73 (Aug. 27, 1962).
80a If a corporation, in return for property, acquires stock of another corporation
from one in control of both corporations before the acquisition, such property shall be
treated as received in redemption of stock of the acquiring corporation. As to the person
transferring stock, the amount received shall be treated as a distribution of property
under Section 302(d), unless as to such person, the amount received is to be treated in
exchange for the stock under 302(a) or 303. Treas. Reg. § 1.304-2 (1955).
87
 The instant court found no plan of contraction or actual contraction; the initia-
tive for the stock transfer came from petitioner; at a time when the corporation had
accumulated (in fact) earnings and profits; that cash dividends had never been paid;
that the distribution was pro rata; and that petitioner's proportionate interest in the
corporations was unaltered (applying the constructive stock ownership rules of section
318(a) (2) (C), petitioner continued to own 100 per cent of the outstanding stock of
both corporations).
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arguing off-setting or over-riding corporate business purpose, took the posi-
tion that the creation of. a parent-subsidiary relationship strengthened the
credit position of the two corporations, facilitated the free flow of cash be-
tween the corporations, and enabled the corporations to conserve cash through
the medium of filing consolidated returns. The court was unmoved due to the
fact that petitioner had not shown that the bank requested the transfer as a
"condition precedent to future financing" nor did he establish that the cor-
porations were "unable to obtain adequate financing prior to the transfer."
Thus, no showing of business crisis. The court, recognizing that the filing of
consolidated returns by affiliated corporations often results in tax savings,
thus conceded a "minimal bona fide business purpose in the stock transfer"
but held the "mere existence of a single bona fide business purpose will not
of itself conclusively determine (emphasis supplied1"68 the applicability of
section 302(b) (1), citing Fewell, Bradbury, Neff, etc. The emphasized
phrase was, as far as this discussion is concerned, one of the "battle slogans"
under the 1939 Code; thus, note well the context in which it is used. This
court very properly equates a minimal bona fide business purpose with the
time worn single bona fide business purpose and forecloses any argument of
uncertainty. On the other hand, Bradbury equates a business purpose argu-
ment with the single bona fide business purpose thereby fostering both un-
certainty and inequality—uncertainty in that the so-called slogan must be
applied to the particular facts and not reiterated as an abstract rule of law
—inequality in that taxpayers in a Ballenger court, for example, would have
the benefit of arguing over-riding business purpose.
REDEMPTION OF STOCK WHICH EFFECTS A DISCHARGE OF SHAREHOLDER'S
INDEBTEDNESS TO A THIRD PARTY
Decker v. Commissioner 69—Decker was the first of four cases thus far de-
ciding whether or not such a transaction amounted to a taxable dividend
under the 1954 Code. Basically, the facts consist of a corporation of five
shareholders who had entered into an agreement whereby, upon the death
of a stockholder, the survivors would purchase the decedent's stock at book
value. In 1954 such a transaction took place but immediately upon purchase
the stock was transferred to the corporation for an amount equal to the
purchase price. Holding the stock in treasury, thereafter the corporation be-
gan transferring it to key employees at a substantial gain. The tax court,
concluding that the net effect of the transaction when completed amounts to a
purchase by the corporation of the deceased stockholder's shares, held: pay-
ments made by the corporation to the surviving shareholders were not es-
sentially equivalent to dividends under Section 115 (g) of the 1939 Code and
Section 302 of the 1954 Code. Three persuasive reasons were advanced for
the decision:
[1] From the standpoint of the company, by adjusting its book
entries7° this could be made to appear the same as the distribution
68 Supra note 66, at 10.
69 32 T.C. 326, aff'd per curiam, 286 F,2d 427 (6th Cir. 1960).
79 This would require reducing the accumulated and undivided profits by the amounts
paid out for the stock and not entering the treasury stock as an asset.
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of a dividend. . However, this would be somewhat unrealistic
in view of the fact that the company has since realized over $75,000
from the sale of this stock to key employees . . . the cash paid out
by the corporation did not wind up in the hands of the shareholder
to whom a dividend is sought to be charged but in the estate of a
deceased stockholder which simply sold the stock for that amount.
[Footnote added.] 71
[2] Petitioners did not receive any true economic benefit from the
transactions when considered as a whole. They had the same
amount of cash and the same number of shares of stock after the
transactions were completed as they had before the death of the de-
ceased stockholder. Their stock represented a higher percentage of
equity in the basic assets of the company, but those basic assets
were reduced proportionately so the stock actually represented the
same values assuming that the book value for which the stock was
bought and sold represented the value of the underlying assets. 72
[3] Petitioner's obligation here was to purchase stock for its book
value. Presumably, the stock was worth what was paid for it. Had
petitioners bought and retained the stock, their net worths would
have remained the same. The corporation did not pay a pre-existing
debt of the petitioners, the satisfaction of which would increase their
net worths. They realized no economic benefit from the transaction.
And here the resale to the corporation was obviously a part of a plan
to buy the stock of the deceased stockholder in a manner that was
best for all concerned. [Emphasis supplied.]"
From a careful reading of the case and in view of the subsequent cases
to be discussed, the two most essential elements of the opinion were the find-
ing of "no economic benefit" to the petitioner and a "plan." The former is
obvious for the court uses it as a central theme in all three of its reasons.
However, the latter is not, and as the Idol and McGinty cases discussed
infra point up, it is by far the most important. In a dominant shareholder-
close corporation situation, if it can be established that the corporation had
no intention of redeeming the stock or no legitimate reason to, then the trans-
action is shareholder motivated. This, as we have seen, shifts an almost in-
surmountable burden of proof onto the taxpayer. On the other hand, here it
was shown that the corporation had a legitimate use for the redeemed stock
and which, coupled with the lack of economic benefit to petitioner, clearly
supports the result reached.
The case is further significant considering the court's treatment of Wall v.
United States, 74
 its biggest stumbling block in applying 302 (b) (1). Wall,
a fifty per cent stockholder, had obliged himself on a number of promissory
notes to purchase the remaining stock interest. Both the notes, and his
equity in the stock, he subsequently turned over to the corporation which
71
 Supra note 69, at 332.
72
 Id. at 333.
73 Ibid.
74 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947).
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entered the stock on its books as treasury stock. When the corporation paid
out on the notes, the transaction was regarded as though the money had been
paid to Wall and transmitted by him to the creditor. The court was unwaiv-
ering in its position that the corporation had satisfied Wall's existing indebt-
edness out of its surplus, thus in legal effect, Wall had received a dividend.
Among others, the court rejected the argument that Wall received no eco-
nomic benefit nor could he incur a taxable gain until he sold his stock. Con-
sidering that Section 115(g) (1) of the 1939 Code was conditioned by the
phrase "at such time . 	 as to make the distribution and . . . redemption
. . . essentially equivalent to 	 • a taxable dividend," the court's conclusion
is proper for it implies application "immediately after" the distribution." The
taxpayer further argued that the stock held in treasury was consideration for
the discharge of his obligation but this too was rejected because his pro-
portionate interest in the corporation remained the same before and after
the corporate acquisition. One further statement of opinion is worthy of
note: "If Wall had paid for the stock in cash and then sold the stock to
the corporation] for the same price, he would clearly have been taxable on
the latter transaction under Section 115(g) if the payment .. . was made
from surplus."76
This in essence, however, is the Decker case. Thus to distinguish it,
the court first cites Wall as establishing certain factual criteria that should be
considered; points out that there is no magic formula or combination of these
criteria that will give the conclusive answer; talks of according proper weight
to each factor; and then concludes that tax avoidance was not a major con-
sideration in the transaction, stressing the existence of the corporate plan to
prevent the stock from falling into the hands of widows, minors or outsiders,
and to sell the stock to key employees. With respect to this latter point, ob-
serve the court's language:
There was no corporate business purpose for the corporation [in
Wall] to pay these obligations and the only ones benefiting there-
from were the stockholders. ... In our case, none of the petition-
ers ever had complete ownership . . . and we believe there was a
sound business reason for the corporation to acquire the stock.
While petitioners may have been obligated to purchase the stock of
a deceased stockholder, this is a different sort of obligation from
those in ... Wall. . . . 77
I doubt if the court was correct in the last statement, for as we have
seen, the Wall court didn't seem to think so. At any rate, the distinguishing
75 The court in Walt stated:
We are not now concerned with the broad question whether the business in
which the taxpayer is engaged will ultimately result to his advantage and show
a profit on his investment when it is finally liquidated, but with the much nar-
rower question whether in 1939 the taxpayer in legal effect received a dividend
from the corporation through the payment by it of the $5000 note ....
Id. at 465. Consider the court's language in Milton F. Priester, note 87 infra, on this
point—especially the text to note 84 infra.
75 Supra note 74, at 465.
77 Supra note 69, at 333.
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feature, which is blatantly obvious, is the existence of the corporate plan.
Considering that the court used a weighted test, this was a major factor in
the decision. Furthermore the economic benefit theory advanced by Decker,
was facilitated by the fact that the "time" provision of 115(g) was not
carried over into the 1954 Code. Thus, the court could view the transaction
from a broader base.
Milton F. Priester78—Here the petitioner was a minority shareholder in a
two-stockholder corporation. He entered into an agreement to purchase all
the stock of the majority holder; payments to be made in installments subject
to a default clause which would mature all unpaid installments and an
escrow agreement which would permit the escrow agent to sell petitioner's
deposited stock in satisfaction of the debt. When it became apparent that
he could not meet the first installment, petitioner secured another investor
to purchase the stock. The sale was conditioned by petitioner's assurance
that the corporation would purchase or redeem said stock within six months
to a year from date of purchase at a profit to the investor. As a result of the
sale and subsequent redemption, petitioner became sole shareholder of the
corporation.
On these facts, the Commissioner argued, as he did in Decker, that the
corporation had employed its earned surplus in discharge of petitioner's ob-
ligation to a third party, without adequate consideration. The results then,
effected a constructive distribution of a taxable dividend to petitioner of the
amount paid to the investor in redemption of his stock under the principle
of Wall v. United States." To support this contention, the Commissioner
had to argue that the investor was but a mere straw.
The tax court, however, made short work of such an argument noting
that not only was the investor a professional by reputation, but that the terms
of his purchase agreement negated such a finding. Moreover, the court con-
cluded that the petitioner did not receive either directly or indirectly any of
the amount which the corporation paid to the investor. This is, in essence,
the rationale in Decker, i.e., petitioner received no economic benefit. 8° The
court further reasoned that the corporation could not discharge an indebted-
ness of the petitioner by the redemption because his obligation had already
been cancelled when the investor purchased the stock. It is submitted that
this does nothing more than to dilute the force of the decision. It is not a
sequitur for if it had been found that the investor was a straw then Judge
Tietjens might well have been writing for the majority rather than for the
dissentors stating: "When the smoke cleared .. . [t]he net effect was a
taxable dividend to petitioner." 81 The court will always look through form
to the substance of the transaction. 82
78 38 T.C. No. 36 (May 29, 1962).
70 Supra note 74.
80 The court referred to Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958)
(1939 Code), involving a similar situation where it was stated that "the real question is
whether the taxpayers received any financial or economic benefits as a result of the re-
demption of the stock. . . ." In concluding, the court also cited Decker.
Si Supra note 78, at 14.
82 E.g., Gregory v. Helvering, supra note 55. Also, see the discussion of Edgar S.
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One further argument by the Commissioner worthy of note was the
proposition that the petitioner benefited indirectly by becoming the sole re-
maining stockholder and possibly by an appreciation in the value of his stock
due to such undivided ownership of the company. In rejecting this argument,
the court reasoned from Halsey v. Commissioner 843 :
It is of course, true that the taxpayer was benefited indirectly by
the distribution. The value of his own stock was increased, since
. . . he became sole stockholder. But these benefits operated only
to increase the value of the taxpayer's stock holdings; they could
not give rise to taxable income within the meaning of the Sixteenth
Amendment until the corporation makes a distribution to the tax-
payer or his stock is sold.. . .
[I] f a man owns shares in a corporation which gradually become
more valuable through the years he is not taxed because of the in-
crease in value even though he is richer at the end of each year than
he was at the end of the year before. If he disposes of that which
has increased, of course he must pay tax upon his profit. All of this
is hornbook law of taxation; nobody denies it. 84
The court then drew three conclusions in reaching its result:
(1) petitioner received none of the distribution in redemption of the
investor's stock, to wit, no economic benefit;
(2) the corporation did not discharge an existing financial obligation
of the petitioner;
(3) nor did he receive any indirect taxable benefit by becoming the
sole stockholder, without more.
It is submitted, that in deciding this case, the first conclusion could well
have been determinative under the rationale of Decker for there the court
went to great lengths pointing out that there could be no taxable event if, in
fact, no economic benefit passed to the taxpayer. The existence of a cor-
porate plan or a legitimate corporate use for the stock (a corporate intent to
purchase the stock) might be difficult to establish on these facts, but then
the case was not argued on this point, so obviously such evidence would be
lacking. However, if we assume that the stock was worth what the corpora-
tion paid, then it did receive consideration, and as Decker points out, to
find a dividend would require ignoring the redeemed stock now held in
treasury 8e
It may well be that this argument is open to the criticism that it con-
travenes the express intent of Congress in separating the "essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend" language into what happens at the shareholder level
Idol, text to note 87 et seq. infra, where the court, in an analogous situation looked
through the form to the substance of the transaction and found a taxable dividend, and
Bradbury v. Commissioner, supra note 17, at 114 where the court stressed that tax laws
deal with "realities" and look at the "entire transaction."
83 Supra note 80.
84 Id. at 868.
65 Supra note 69, at 332.
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[302(b) (I)] and the corporate level [346(a) (2)1, for here we are talking
of corporate intent as being a necessary ingredient if the transaction is to
fall within 302(b) (1). But the cases compel this conclusion. This "corpo-
rate intent" is no different than the legitimate corporate business purpose
discussed in Bradbury, Neff, Carey, Ballenger et al. Thus, as a factor to be
considered in determining net effect, it is a necessary ingredient in any de-
termination of section 302 (b) (1). Considering the Ballenger opinion, this is
belaboring the obvious. However, the point of contention is that "corporate
business purpose", viewed as a factor, requires examination at the corporate
level, to wit, corporate motive. Consequently, if "business purpose" is a
proper consideration under 302(b) (1), and the courts are unanimous that
it is, how can dividend equivalency be decided solely by looking at what
happens at the shareholder level?
Obviously then, Congress only intended that one type of redemption be di-
vorced from section 115 in drafting section 346(a) (2)—that of corporate
contraction." Legitimate corporate shrinkage, should be distinguished from
this line of cases where there is no lessening of corporate activity. The former
are partial liquidations, the latter may or may not be taxable dividends.
Edgar S. Idol87—The third case in point of time is perhaps the most interest-
ing of the series. It is significant in that it highlights the ease with which the
tax court will look past the form to the substance of the transaction in find-
ing dividend equivalence.
Idol, desirous of purchasing the outstanding stock of Speedway Trans-
ports Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Speedway) represented by ninety shares
held by one Florman, entered into a contract of sale and an escrow agree-
ment. By the terms of the agreement, the stock was registered in Idol's
name, he in turn promising to deliver to the escrow agent $112,500 in ex-
change for the stock. Idol, further assumed management control of the
corporation. To effect the agreement, Idol borrowed $112,500 from Security
Credit Company on February 28, depositing it in his own bank account. The
following day he loaned Speedway $60,000 which the corporation on that same
day used to redeem forty-eight shares of Florman's stock. Also on the 29th,
Idol issued a check payable to Florman in the amount of $52,500 for which he
received the remaining forty-two shares of Speedway stock held in escrow.
These he used as security for his loan.
On February 28, Idol also entered into an agreement with Speedway and
Cassens Transport Co. (hereinafter referred to as Cassens) whereby Cassens
would purchase thirty-two of Idol's forty-two shares for $40,000. Immedi-
ately following the purchase, a special meeting was to be held during which
the corporation would redeem the thirty-two shares held by Cassens in ex-
change for operating rights and equipment of Speedway. On March 1,
Speedway issued to Idol its promissory note for the $60,000 and on May 1,
the agreement with Cassens was consummated. Idol applied the $40,000 re-
80 See the discussion,.supra note 13, where Professor Bittker states this conclusion.
87 38 T.C. No. 47 (June 27, 1962).
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ceived from Cassens as well as $41,300 received from Speedway in subse-
quent payments on its note, against his loan from Security Credit.
On these facts, the tax court sustained the Commissioner's contention
that the payments by Speedway to Idol on its alleged note constituted dis-
tributions essentially equivalent to dividends within the meaning of section
302(b) (1). The court reasoned that despite all the evidence of indebtedness,
the transaction
was wholly lacking in substance. The sole purpose of the trans-
action initiated by Idol was the satisfaction of his personal obliga-
tion to Florman . . . No corporate purpose was served by the re-
acquisition by Speedway of 48 shares of its shock from its sole
stockholder." Therefore, although the parties have cast the trans-
action in the form of loan, we are convinced . . . that no actual
borrowing of funds by Speedway from Idol took place. [Footnote
added.] 89
The court cited Wall as authority although recognizing that factually, the
case was not squarely in point. Alternatively, it treated the corporate pay-
ments as distributions in partial discharge of Idol's indebtedness to Security
Credit.
As to the transaction with Cassens, the Commissioner called it "tax-
motivated sham manipulations and in actuality constituted a sale of assets
by Speedway to Cassens followed by a dividend distribution . . . of $40,000
to Idol"" and well it was for there was considerable evidence indicating that
all Cassens was interested in was the equipment.
The tax court agreed:
It is true ... that on its face the transitory registration of stock
ownership in the name of Cassens followed by registration in the
name of Speedway and accompanied by a shifting of stock cer-
tificates representing 32 shares from Idol to Cassens to Speedway,
formally complies with the requirements of stock redemption under
section 302(b) (3) of the 1954 Code, and looks like a . . . 'com-
plete redemption of all the stock . . owned by [Cassens].'
[However, it] was so transitory and so clearly inconsistent with
the actual purposes and intentions of the parties and the ultimate
results . .. to be entirely lacking in substance. The purpose of
Speedway was to transfer assets to Cassens and it did so; the pur-
pose of Cassens was to acquire . . . assets of Speedway and it did
so. Thus, in effect, Cassens purchased assets from Speedway even
though it momentarily received stock in order to do so. 9 '
88 The first paragraph of the stock purchase contract states that the "Vendor hereby
sells to Vendee all of the capital stock of Speedway Transports Inc." Paragraph 4 author-
ized Idol to sell the stock prior to his discharge of liability to Florman in the event of
a sale of Speedway's business or assets. The stock was registered in Idol's name and he
exercised complete management and control of Speedway. On these facts, the court was
of the opinion that Idol was the sole owner of the corporate stock.
lo Supra note 87, at 14.
00 Id. at 15.
01- Id. at 17-18.
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Despite the lengthy opinion, the court does place its thumb on the
pulse of the matter in stating: "Petitioners have not established that Speed-
way had a real intention to reduce its capital or to redeem any part of its
outstanding stock."02 Failing thus, everything is shareholder motivated.
Considering that the court, looking through form, found the distribution to
be constructively pro rata and that earnings and profits were (in fact)
available for distribution, either test set out in Ballenger would produce the
same result.
Nevertheless, the pervading factor in this line of cases is inescapable
here, i.e., what economic benefit did Idol receive with respect to the $60,000
transaction. If Florman sold forty-two shares to Idol and the corporation
redeemed the remaining forty-eight, there would be no dividend. As the
Decker court concluded, the net effect of the transaction when completed
amounted to a purchase by the corporation.
However, the argument is without merit in view of the above quoted
language of the opinion—". . actual purposes and intentions of the parties
and the ultimate results .. ." states the court—not or the ultimate results.
Thus, speaking in the conjunctive rather than the alternative, the court imposes
a dual aspect. In terms of the earlier discussion this duality is "economic
benefit" and "corporate intent or plan." As stated, the language of the
court supports the conclusion reached in Decker emphasizing the fact that
the finding of "no economic benefit" without the finding of a "plan" is not
sufficient to prevent the operation of section 302(b) (1) in cases of this
nature.
Aloysius J. McGinty93—Last but certainly not least, McGinty in raising
still another problem in this area brings out the distinguishing features of
the important pre-1954 Code cases.
In substance, McGinty, a minority stockholder in 1950, contracted to
purchase all the remaining outstanding stock of the B Corporation. The
purchase was financed by a formal loan of $40,000 executed by the corpora-
tion to McGinty's wife. The - proceeds of the loan were turned over to the
sellers who endorsed their shares to McGinty. In 1954, petitioner as sole
stockholder surrendered the shares thus purchased to the corporation for
redemption in cancellation of his wife's indebtedness. HELD: The dis-
charge of indebtedness in consideration for the shares was essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend and taxable to the extent of $19,000 of available (in
fact) corporate earnings and profits—citing the Wall case.
Heavy reliance was placed on the distinction between Holsey and Wall,
decided under the 1939 Code." In the former the taxpayer had assigned
92 Id. at 17.
93 38 T.C. No. 89 (Sept. 17, 1962).
94 The court stated that the Priester court, supra note 78, in applying Holsey, rec-
ognized the operative scope of the Wall case. However, the "undisputed" point of con-
tention that the court relies on from Priester was, in that decision, pure unadulterated
dictum. The context in which it is contained was not a conclusion of the Priester court
but rather a premise of the Commissioner's argument as re-stated by the court. Courts,
faced with the responsibility of deciding cases on the basis of a factual inquiry would
do well to refrain from such practices.
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an "option to purchase" to the corporation—thus no obligation on the part
of the taxpayer to purchase, and in the latter the taxpayer was under a
contractual obligation to purchase—which obligation was discharged when
the corporation assumed his notes. True, the latter is similar to the instant
case and is forceful precedent for finding a dividend. However, the other
conclusion in Holsey, that of no economic benefit to the taxpayer, is available
for argument, conditioned, of course, on the finding of a plan.
McGinty argued that he could have achieved the same result by having
the corporation purchase the stock directly from the seller. However, "the
point is that he did not," countered the court—unmindful apparently of the
extent to which the Decker court went beyond the form to the substance of the
transaction. In finding that the corporation distributed a dividend in dis-
charge of petitioner's indebtedness, the court drew from the language of
several 1939 Code cases as a complete answer to petitioner's position:
. . . it is form which often must prevail, when the delicate question
involved is whether the extraction of a corporation's earned surplus
has been accomplished at less than the rates taxed upon ordinary in-
come .. . If a taxpayer has two legal methods by which he may
attain a desired result, the method pursued is determinative for
tax purposes without regard to the fact that different tax results
would have attached if the alternative procedure had been followed
. . . . Indeed the statute directs that the 'manner' of the trans-
action be the controlling factor."
This is the novel feature of the decision, for the tap of a "form over
substance" result will almost invariably give off a hollow sound. At any
rate, note the emphasis afforded the word "manner" in the above passage."
Since this was a term of the essentially equivalent to a dividend provision
of the 1939 Code, it might well justify the form over substance result in
these pre-1954 Code cases. Section 115(g) stated "at such time and in
such manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption in
whole or in part essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable
dividend." Thus, if the taxpayer chose a manner that was essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend, it would be controlling. But since section 115(g) has
been codified into section 302(b) and the language "in such manner" elim-
inated, it could well be that the justification for the above results was also
eliminated. Net effect, ultimate result, no economic benefit and the finding
of a plan are more appropriate tools in a working of section 302(b) (1). Sub-
mitted, therefore, that the form over substance argument contravenes the
application of any net effect test" and has no significance within the mean-
95
 Supra note 93, at 5.
06 The McGinty court recognized this in a footnote of its opinion but considered
it unimportant because it. believed that the 1954 Code provisions were intended to
incorporate the interpretation given section 115(g) of the prior law." Ibid. The infer-
ence running here is that the court intended all existing law to carry over into section
302. The Senate Report expressly negates this.
97 "In determining the incidence of taxation, we must look through form and search
out the substance of a transaction." Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331,
333 (1945).
The basic concept of tax law is particularly pertinent to cases involving a series
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ing of section 302. Considering the extent to which the Idol court looked
through form in finding a dividend, the instant court's argument cannot
stand. If any degree of certainty is ever to be achieved in this area of the
law, the test of net effect must be likened to a double-edged sword—surely it
must cut both ways. Therefore, the case would more properly have been
decided on the basis of the first three cases of this series, i.e., conceding no
economic benefit to the petitioner but finding no evidence of a plan rather
than on the court's nebulous concept of form over substance.
CONSTRUCTIVE STOCK OWNERSHIP
Archbold v. United States"—A corporation redeemed all of its issued and
outstanding preferred stock, held exclusively by the petitioner. At the time
of the transaction, petitioner's husband and son held eighty-nine per cent of
the issued and outstanding common stock which was constructively at-
tributed to her by virtue of section 318. As a result, the distribution was
held to be essentially equivalent to a dividend within the meaning of section
302(b) (1) because her proportionate interest in the total combined stock
of the corporation before and after was constructively considered to be ninety-
eight per cent. Thus, her precentage of ownership and degree of control over
the corporation was unaltered by the redemption.
The court further found that there was no contraction; that there was
no evidence as to the initiation of the redemption, and in so closely held a
corporation such evidence would not be significant; and that the corpora-
tion bad, in fact, earned surplus in excess of the distribution. However, the
most significant factor considered by the court was that petitioner's holdings
were by reason of section 318 substantially identical before and after the
distribution. Nor should this be surprising, if in fact the Bradbury case
was rightfully decided. Recall that the Bradbury court, applying section 318,
determined that the distribution was pro rata, treating it as the "basic cri-
terion" and affording it a "pre-eminent position." 00 But even, if one wishes
to quarrel with the Bradbury court, the virtual conclusive presumption at-
tached to pro rata distributions as reasoned by Judge Bell in the Ballenger
case° would compel such a result.
However, the point of discussion is not whether the distribution is pro
rata but rather whether is should be considered pro rata per force of section
318, and if so, whether the same significance should attach to a constructive
pro rata redemption as to an actual pro rata redemption. In answer to the
first, the rules of section 318 are expressly made applicable to section 302 by
reason of section 302(c) (I) which states that ". . . section 318(a) shall
apply in determining the ownership of stock for purposes of this section."
of transactions designed and executed as parts of a unitary plan to achieve an
intended result. Such plans will be viewed as a whole regardless of whether
the effect of so doing is imposition of a relief from taxation. The series of closely
related steps in such a plan are merely the means by which to carry out the
plan and will not be separated.
Kanawha- Gas & Utilities Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685, 691 (5th Cir. 1954).
98 201 F. Stipp. 329 (D. N.J. 1962).
90 See text to supra note 22.
100 See text to supra note 53.
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One writer, however, advances an argument exempting 302 (b) (1). He notes
that the words "ownership" and "owned" are found only in sections
302(b) (2) and (b) (3); that 302(b) (1), the section that deals broadly with
redemptions not essentially equivalent to a dividend, is silent as to these
terms. It then follows in his opinion, as a matter of strict statutory con-
struction that section 318 does not apply to section 302(b) (1).101 A s a
practical matter, however, both the Treasury Regulations to the 1954 Codel°2
and more importantly, the general interpretation of the courts have favored
its application. Thus, the question is more one of degree of application.
The Commissioner in two early rulings went no further than attribution
of ownership in finding that the redemption distributions did not qualify for
sale or exchange treatment under section 302(b) (1), 1 " thus treating the
application of section 318 as conclusive. As stated earlier, the Bradbury
and, from the above language, the Archbold courts are relatively in accord.
On the other hand, it has been urged that if "this section [302(b) (1)1 is to
offer any flexibility, the attribution should not be conclusive—but merely
a factor." 1" Judge Spencer Bell in Ballenger implies as much suggesting
that "the attribution of ownership rules should not be too literally ap-
plied,"l" and the regulations expressly state that constructive stock owner-
ship is but "one of the facts to be considered."'"
Consequently, placing section 318 in its proper perspective, i.e., a fact
to be considered, we gain insight into both the argument advanced above
exempting the application of 318 to 302(b) (1) and the arguments to be
advanced. Moreover, it has been urged that section 302(b) (1) should be
used to alleviate the hardships of the attribution rules for it is quite con-
ceivable that (1) a taxpayer could lose the capital gains treatment of section
302(b) (2) because of a technicality in not having several additional shares
redeemed; (2) the transaction would fall outside of 302(b) (1) because the
distribution would be constructively pro rata per force of section 318; and
(3) yet because of other factors, the transaction might in fact be a sale
rather than a redemption.
If the virtually conclusive dividend presumption attaches alike to both
actual pro rata distributions and constructive pro rata distributions, then I
fear my hypothetical taxpayer will completely agree with Adam Smith, for
surely the uncertainties involved will work a grave evil.
The problem is further illustrated by Professor Bittker in his statements
. . . that by reason of family estrangement (for example), shares
owned by a spouse or by children should not be attributed to the tax-
payer whose shares are being redeemed, thus allowing the redemption
to qualify under §302(b) (1) although the attribution rules would
lot Cohen, Redemptions of Stock Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 103
U. Pa. L. Rev. 739, 759 (1955).
102 Treas. Reg. § 1.302-1 (1955).
103 Rev. Rul. 56-103, 1956-1 Cum, Bull. 159; Rev. Rul. 55-515, 1955-2 Cum. Bull.
222.
104 Gratch, How to Redeem a Shareholder's Stock, 39 Taxes 169 (1961).
305 Supra note 47, at 199 n.20.
100 Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955).
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prevent it from qualifying as a 'substantially disproportionate' re-
demption under §302(b)(2).'"
The reasoning is quite simple. When dissension between shareholders
threatens to dissolve the corporation, the underlying rationale for attribution
is completely rebutted. A stockholder at odds with other stockholders can-
not realistically be considered as controlling the corporation merely because
the latter's stock is constructively attributed to him. Thus, the application
of section 302(b) (1) in this situation is not only justified from the stand-
point of statutory purposes but as a matter of economic policy.'" "Taxation
of this transaction as a sale or exchange . . . would probably increase the
frequency of corporate buy-outs, with a concomitant decrease in the severity
and longevity of dissension. Such treatment would also decrease the cost
of such buy-outs to the corporation. . . ." 1" The result, at any rate, has
caused some concern lest these redemptions which fail to meet the mechanical
test of 302 (b) (2) and (3) because attribution made them essentially pro
rata, might also fail to qualify for capital gains treatment for the same
reason."°
Thomas G. Lewis 111—The most that can be said for this case is that it
increased the above mentioned concern because
. . . the picture thus presented is one of corporate withdrawals from
time to time by a dominant stockholder for her needs, where the
corporation has never declared a dividend although having sufficient
accumulated earnings and profits to do so, followed finally by a
cancellation of the indebtedness in exchange for stock upon the
death of that stockholder when only her estate had an interest in the
enterprise, when such cancellation and redemption could not pos-
sibly have any economic effect upon any stockholder-corporation
relationship, and where there was no plan either to contract the
corporate enterprise or to use the redeemed shares in any manner
for a corporate purpose. 112
The decedent held a fifty-five per cent ownership of the corporate stock,
the remainder being held by her daughters and their husbands. Her with-
107
 Bittker, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders 233-34
(1959).
108
 Supra note 104, at 177-78.
10° Id. at 178.
Another situation which should fall within section 302(b) (I) is when the re-
demption is the result of the distributor's complete in fact and not just form
retirement from the business. Here again, harmony and continuity of corpo-
rate management and skill seem to be the primary forces behind the redemption,
and they seem to be sufficient to overcome any presumption that the transac-
tion was a scheme to drain off corporate earnings at capital gains rates.
Ibid.
110 Sutter, Corporate Distributions of Property; Stock and Stock Rights—Dividend
or Redemption? 39 Taxes 982, 983 (1961).
111 35 T.C. 71 (Oct. 20, 1960).
112 Id. at 78.
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drawals exceeded $20,000 at the time of her death and aside from her cor-
porate stock, the value of her estate was less than her indebtedness owing
to the corporation. Thus, her estate sold fifty shares to the corporation in
satisfaction of the debt reducing the estate's ownership from fifty-five per
cent to forty-five per cent and distributed the remaining stock to her
daughters.
The tax court conceded that under the 1939 Code this might not have
been "essentially equivalent to a dividend" because the redemption materially
altered the proportionate ownership of the estate. In fact, if the redemption
had been effected by the decedent while alive, it could have qualified for
capital gains treatment under the mechanical test of section 302 (b)(2) had
a few additional shares been redeemed to reduce her retained percentage to
forty-three per cent. But since section 318 caused the estate to be con-
sidered as owner of 100 per cent of the stock, 113 the redemption was held to
be a pro rata distribution and a taxable dividend.
The pivotal point of decision was the pro rata nature of the distribu-
tion. In view of what has been said, if we can question the Bradbury court's
overindulgent application of the constructive pro rata effect, what of the
instant decision? Here, the court used a double application of section 318
whereby the daughters were treated as owning the stock of their husbands
and the estate as owning the stock of the daughters in order to conclude that
the redemption was pro rata. If attribution is but a factor, should the court
have so heavily relied upon a constructive finding of pro rata? Should they
have stated that they "must" so attribute the stock? In answering this
question, bear in mind the exception to the constructive ownership rules as
provided in section 318(a) (4)(B) pertaining to stock owned within a family
group. The exception is intended to make clear that unless the stock is
directly attributable to the individual whose stock ownership is in question,
the constructive ownership rules of section 318(a) (I) do not apply, thus
eliminating the type of double attribution operative in the instant case. At
least with respect to family groups, Congress has recognized the harshness
of such practice. The exception does not apply to estates, but its very ex-
istence should be a further consideration in determining the true pro rata
nature of the distribution and the weight to be afforded such a constructive pro
rata finding. Furthermore, why wasn't the redemption brought within the
shelter of section 303? From the facts as presented, it appears that the
mechanics of that section have been satisfied.
Estate of Arthur H. Squier"4—judge Raum, who had decided the Lewis
113 Applying the constructive ownership rules of section 318(a), we must con-
sider that the stock owned by the husbands of the three daughters is to be attrib-
uted to the daughters themselves under paragraph (1) (A) (i) ; that the stock thus
attributed to them must be treated under paragraph (4) as 'actually owned by'
them; and that therefore their own stock plus the stock thus attributed to them
must in turn be attributed to the estate under the second sentence of para-
graph (2) (A) . . . . [Therefore] the estate is to be regarded as owning 100
per cent of the stock.
Supra note 111 at 78.
114 35 T.C. 950 (Mar. 16, 1961).
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case, also decided Squier. The case was cast in a similar setting whereby an
estate held 50.09 per cent of a corporation's stock directly and a total of
63.30 per cent directly and constructively, the remainder being held by an
unrelated party. The corporation had an extremely conservative history of
dividend payments but more importantly, as emphasized by the court, there
was a cleavage between the estate and those persons whose stock was at-
tributed to it. Thus, a redemption of estate stock sufficient to reduce the
estate's direct holding to 41.27 per cent and its attributed holdings to 56.82
per cent was held not essentially equivalent to a dividend. The court reasoned
that while section 318 precluded the redemption from satisfying the mechan-
ical tests of section 302(b) (2) and (3), they did not make the redemption
pro rata since there was a substantial minority interest.
The court did an admirable job in distinguishing Lewis on its facts
despite the contentions of the parties which revolved largely around the ap-
plicability of the Lewis decision. It would have been very easy for the court
to "muddy" its decision by over-emphasizing any pro rata effect or dominant
shareholder position by applying section 318, especially in view of its strong
pro rata language in Lewis. But to the contrary, Judge Raum tersely re-
marked that "in spite of the attribution rules . . . the redemptions herein
in fact resulted in a crucial reduction of the estate's control over the corpora-
tion. . . . We think these circumstances serve to distinguish the Lewis
case."'" Not only did the Commissioner acquiesce in the decision but it was
followed in the much weaker Parker case.
Herbert C. Parker116—The taxpayer held 50.3 per cent of the corporate
stock; his son whose stock was attributed to the taxpayer owned 47.4 per
cent, and the balance or 2.3 per cent was held by an outsider. When the
taxpayer sold sixty per cent of his stock to the corporation, the Commissioner
contended that he failed to meet the tests of section 302(b) (1) arguing
. . . that the constructive ownership rules of section 318 must be
applied in determining essential equivalence to a dividend under
section 302(b)(1); that Congress intended to confine section
302(b)(1) to non-voting preferred stock redemptions and minority
stock redemptions; and that, in any event, this redemption does not
qualify for sale or exchange treatment even under the more liberal
rule of section 11_5(g) (1) of the 1939 Code." 7
However, the court recognized that the
effect of the redemption was to transfer effective control of the cor-
poration from Parker to his son, with whom he had had substantial
controversy about the running of the business prior to the redemp-
tion. This transfer of control, preceded by disagreements as to the
management of the Company, so affects the total factual picture as
to persuade us that, notwithstanding the family relations involved,
115 Id. at 955-56.
115 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 893 (1961).
117
 Id. at 900.
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this redemption of petitioners' stock only was not essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend." 8
Note the mandatory language of the Commissioner in stating that the
attribution rules must be applied. This language was used in Lewis and in-
ferred in Bradbury, among others. The court here, however, places attribu-
tion in its true perspective relying heavily on Squier and distinguishing Lewis
because there "the findings [were] devoid of any reference to controversy or
adversity of interest among the various shareholder interests."Il°
The result coincides with the present views of two writers, Bittker12°
and Gratch,121 discussed supra, although the latter in treating this line of
cases was not too optimistic about the future. He pondered whether
the courts will be more flexible in their application of the attribu-
tion rules to Section 302(b)(1) or whether they will accept the
Commissioner's conclusive approach but will hold that a different
definition of 'equivalent to a dividend' is to be applied in these con-
structive ownership cases, or whether they will fully sustain the
Commissioner, remains to be seen. 122
However, if Lewis, Squier and Parker are indicative of a trend, it would
appear that Gratch is unnecessarily concerned. On the other hand, consider-
ing the emphasis of section 318 in Archbold, a post dated case, perhaps he
is justified for the decision is not clear as to which Gratch-alternative the
court was following.
CORPORATE CONTRACTION AS A FACTOR IN DETERMINING NET EFFECT
It is interesting to note at this point that in the discussion of the cases,
from Bradbury to Archbald, the courts, determining the applicability of
section 302(b) (1), consider "business contraction" as a relevant factor.
Yet, in the introduction of this commentary, it was clearly shown that dis-
tributions resulting from business contractions, if they are to be classed as
"not essentially equivalent to a dividend," must find sanction under section
346(a) (2). If that section primarily involves the concept of corporate
contractions,123 and if the purpose in codifying Section 115 of the 1939
Code was to reclassify "those distributions characterized by what happens
solely at the corporate level by reason of the assets distributed .. . within
the concept of a partial liquidation,"124 how then can these courts justify
such language? Perhaps the most obvious answer lies in the fact that Con-
gress defined the tests to be applied in interpreting the essentially equivalent
language of the 1954 Code as those generally being applied under the 1939
Code. The courts, in alluding to the case law under the latter have indis-
118
 Ibid. The Bradbury court discussed Lewis, Squire and Parker in footnote 7 of
its opinion reaching this same result, Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 116-17
(1st Cir. 1962),
119 Supra note 117.
120 Supra note 107 and accompanying text.
121 Supra notes 108, 109 and accompanying text.
122 Supra note 104, at 176.
123 See the Senate Report, supra note 13 and the accompanying discussion.
124 See text to note 10 supra,
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criminately and in toto applied the early tests which treated both redemption
and partial liquidation as factors determinative of the essentially equivalent
language of section 115. The extracts of court language throughout this
commentary should make this obvious. However, to resolve any doubt, con-
sider the following cases.
Sullivan v. Bookwalter 125—This 1963 reported case deals principally with
the court's charge to the jury which for our purposes is clearly indicative of
the argument advanced above. The court instructed the jury that the case
must be decided within the essentially equivalent to a dividend language of
section 302. Said the court:
If you find that there was a bona fide business purpose in the trans-
fer of .. . stock . .. that there was a plan to contract the
. . . business and ultimately to abandon it . . then these factors
may be considered, although not controlling, as supporting plaintiff's
contention that the transaction was a sale or exchange of a capital
asset.
Factors to be considered by you in determining whether or not the
transaction was essentially equivalent to a dividend are:
1. Whether the distribution resulted in any substantial
change in ownership or control.
2. Whether there was any contraction in corporate busi-
ness.
3. Whether or not there is a legitimate business purpose
for the redemption of the stock.
4. Whether there were earnings or profits available and
the effect on corporate finances as compared with a
regular dividend.
5. The net effect of the over-alI transaction. 12°
Following these detailed instructions, the jury found that the acquisi-
tion of stock of an incorporated automobile dealership for $240,000 by an
incorporated finance company, both of which corporations were controlled
by the plaintiffs, was undertaken for the bona fide business purpose of con-
tracting the automobile dealership activities with a view to ultimately concen-
trating on the financing business. Accordingly, the sale of such stock by the
plaintiffs to the finance company was not a distribution essentially equivalent
to a dividend, within the meaning of section 302.
The charge is devoid of any mention of section 346, supposedly, that
section designated by Congress to deal with corporate contraction or partial
liquidation. The court, in enunciating a strict net effect test incorporating
as factors, both contraction and business purpose, very definitely "muddies
the draftsmen's goal of separating into their significant elements the kind
125
 CCH 1963 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (63-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) T[ 9,151, 87,247 (jan.
1963).
1241 Id. at 87,249.
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of transactions incoherently aggregated by the 1939 Code in the definition
of a partial liquidation. 77127 If the court was aware of the separation of
distributions which may have capital-gain characteristics at the shareholder
level from those characterized by what happens solely at the corporate level,
as attempted by the draftsmen of the 1954 Code,123 it is not reflected in the
opinion for as Professor Chommie states:
Section 346, labeled Partial Liquidations defined, provides the basic
criteria for determining whether a distribution in redemption be-
cause of what 'happens solely at the corporate level' is to be given
capital gains or dividend treatment. This determination depends on
whether the distribution in redemption is 'essentially equivalent'
to a dividend or is 'a genuine contraction of the business.' 129
Thus, this imposition of corporate contraction as an important consideration
in determining dividend equivalency under section 302(b) (1), questions the
usefulness of that section in light of the congressional intent that section
302 looks only to events at the shareholder level.'" The courts in refusing
to recognize the distinction, raise the further question whether or not the
cleavage is more theoretical than practical or in a more hackneyed vein,
whether or not it is possible to teach old dogs new tricks. The latter may
seem a bit unfair, if in fact the courts do recognize the difference and if it
does admit of a practical application. However, it is submitted that clarity
of expression should be a judicial tool of the trade and not merely a rare
and enlightening event. If the distinction is real, the courts should really
distinguish it!
SECTION 346 (a) ( 2 ) 1-n 1-
A distribution is to be treated as in partial liquidation of a
corporation under §346(a) (2) if it (a) 'is not essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend,' (b) is in redemption of a part of the stock of
the corporation pursuant to a plan, and (c) occurs within the tax-
able year in which the plan is adopted or within the succeeding tax-
able year. The first of these requirements invokes the 'corporate
contraction' doctrine and poses some troublesome problems; the
second and third requirements are formal in nature and should
ordinarily be easily satisfied.'"
The pattern of judicial development is therefore the issue before us—
to explore the certainties of section 346(a) (2), if it does admit of certainty,
and to highlight its judicial treatment under the 1954 Code.
Addressing ourselves to the "certainties," we have already seen that
127 See text to note 11 supra.
128 Supra note 10 and accompanying text.
129 Chommie, Section 3461a) (2): The Contraction Theory, 11 Tax L. Rev. 407,
412 (1956).
13" Cf. Gratch, op. cit. supra note 104, at 176.
131 Section 346 defines the term "partial liquidation" although section 331(a)(2) is
the operative provision requiring the distribution in partial liquidation to be treated as
the proceeds of a sale of the stock.
1322
	
op. cit. supra note 107, at 216.
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despite several references to "existing law" in the Senate Report, pre-1954
law of "corporate contractions" was not ratified in all respects. 133 Nor would
such an interpretation be proper in view of such persuasive language to the
contrary in the case of Joseph Inder, 134 cited with approval in the Senate
Report.'" The tax court stated:
The issue here raised presents a question of fact depending on
the circumstances of the particular case . ... No sale or uni-
versally applicable test can be laid down .. .. Though decided
cases are not controlling, they are helpful as indicating what ele-
ments have been considered important, viz., the presence or absence
of a real business purpose, the motives of the corporation at the
time of distribution, the size of the corporate surplus, the past
dividend policy, and the presence of any special circumstance relat-
ing to the distribution. ,"
This basically is Professor Bittker's argument for he believes "it would
be improper to interpret a general intention to carry forward 'existing law'
as either a blanket endorsement of every judicial decision theretofore ren-
dered or as preventing further evolutionary developments in what is at best
an imprecise concept imposed upon very divergent sets of facts."'" With
his argument so conditioned, he concludes that "the existence of conflicting
decisions and inconsistent approaches in the pre-1954 case Iaw makes judicial
choices in the future unavoidable. The 'corporate contraction' doctrine, then,
must be viewed as an organic concept, not as a frozen body of rules." 138
It is difficult to quarrel with his conclusion since literal or inflexible
interpretations, as evidenced by the discussion of section 302 (b) (1), unduly
restricts any type of factual inquiry. However, issue may be taken over
whether or not section 346(a) (2) involves an "imprecise concept." Divorced
from its imprecise setting under the 1939 Code, and placed in its proper
perspective under the 1954 Code, it may readily admit to certainty of ap-
plication.
United States v. Carey" 9—As indicated in the previous discussion of this
case, the Eighth Circuit had the first shot at interpreting the "essentially
equivalent" language of the 1954 Code. Unfortunately, the court sidestepped
a legitimate opportunity to rule on the precise application of section 346(a) (2)
and to differentiate it from section 302 (b) (1).
The trial court held that the redemption, since it resulted in a reduction
of capital (thus a contraction of corporate activity) and because, it was part
of a plan, completed within the time limits prescribed by section 346(a) (2),
133 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 262 (1954d stated flatly that a distribu-
tion of a reserve for expansion is not a partial liquidation.
134 11 T.C. 836 (Nov. 22, 1948).
136 Supra note 133.
136 Supra note 134, at 840.
137 Supra note 132, at 219.
138
 Ibid.
136 289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961) (supra note 42).
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was a distribution in partial liquidation. The circuit court, summarily con-
cluding that "Congress had no intention to change the meaning of 'essentially
equivalent to a dividend' as interpreted by the courts on cases arising under
the 1939 Code,' 14 ° affirmed on the sole ground that section 302(b) (1) was
properly applied. The court in disposing of section 346(a)(2) stated:
Thus we deem it unnecessary to determine the troublesome and
doubtful question of what constitutes a contraction of business
under § 346, and the additional question of whether the court was
justified in determining in its second conclusion that the transaction
resulted in a contraction of the corporate business such as to war-
rant the application of § 346(a) (2).141
Little can be said for such language for the tendency here certainly is
to discourage future resort to section 346(a) (2). If the court considers this
to be a troublesome and doubtful area and that Congress has failed in its
attempt to clarify the mechanics of this section, how can it justify its own
abdication of a judicial function, that of interpreting the law. On this point
the opinion is of little value. Certainly it could have provided a far greater
service to the taxpayers and the practicing bar by at least venturing an
opinion as to whether or not it considered the particular corporate activity
involved a legitimate partial liquidation.
Furthermore, the court failed to consider the treasury regulation which
provides that where both sections 302 and 346 apply—the latter section is
control] ing. t42 Query whether this means that the court should have ruled
on section 346 for had it been applicable, it would have been determinative.
True, the result would have been the same, but considering the criticisms
leveled at the court's application of section 302(b) (1) and the fact that it
was a case of first impression under the new code, the need for interpretation
takes on more significance.
An attempt at "perspective" can be found in Ballenger v. United
States,143 which was previously discussed, where the applicability of section
346(a) (2) was raised on the court's own initiative. 144 The redemption in
question was a final step resulting in complete liquidation of the corporation's
preferred stock over a several year period. However, the court could find no
evidence of a plan of contraction and in fact corporate operations were
steadily expanding. This factor was afforded primary consideration although
the court conceded that a legitimate contraction is not the sole factor.' 45
Other facts considered were the corporation's poor dividend history, earned
surplus in excess of the distribution and the unaltered proportion of stock
ownership and control.
14° Id. at 537.
141 Id. at 536.
142 Treas. Reg. § 1.346-2 (1955).
143 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962) (supra note 49).
144 The taxpayer did not argue' "partial liquidation" nor was the case tried before
the district court on that theory.
145 Judge Spencer Bell cites the sharp criticism of such a reliance on corporate
contraction as a legitimate test in determining whether a redemption is essentially
equivalent to a dividend in Bittker, The Taxation of Stock Redemptions and Partial
Liquidations, 44 Cornell L.Q. 299, 307 n.22 (1959).
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Apart from a poor dividend history, these same factors were considered
in Bradbury v. Commissioner, 146 also previously discussed, where the court
was likewise unable to find a plan or policy of contraction. In Bradbury, as in
Ballenger, the taxpayer did not seek protection under section 346(a) (2)
although she did argue "contraction" as a factor to be considered in determin-
ing the "net effect."
The evidence of a "contraction" consisted of the following facts. The
Bradbury Corporation was engaged principally in the manufacture of long
lumber but as an adjunct to its main operation, it also manufactured box
shocks which were made into boxes in a separate building called the "box
mill." The taxpayer asserted that the capacity of the new mill, after the
then existing box commitments were completed, made possible the closing
of the box mill and elimination of that activity. The Commissioner argued
that this contraction or narrowing of activities was not specifically in con-
templation at the time the stock was redeemed and the construction loan
negotiated. In answer to this the petitioner, in her reply brief, cites an ex-
pression in United States v. Fewell' 47 to the effect that the transaction need
only result in a contraction of the corporation's business. This may have little
merit in view of the "pursuant to a plan" language of section 346(a) (2), but
the point of the matter is petitioner was arguing section 302 (b) (1). Thus the
issue of legislative purpose is squarely raised. If Congress intended distribu-
tions which result from a legitimate shrinkage or contraction of a corporation's
business to be treated under section 346(a) (2), petitioner should have
argued partial liquidation in the alternative and marshalled her facts ac-
cordingly. By arguing "contraction" as a factor in determining net effect,
petitioner completely ignores the legislative purpose in separating certain
types of redemptions that are not essentially equivalent to a dividend. Not
only was her contraction argument diluted by such an approach, but the
taxpayer had to meet head on the attribution rules of section 318. Whether
or not the taxpayer could have advanced a strong enough argument of partial
liquidation, is pure conjecture. However one thing is certain, in pursuing
section 346(a) (2) she could have avoided what turned out to be her biggest
obstacle, the attribution rules of section 318. They do not apply to partial
liquidations, thus, the taxpayer might well have had an easier road to
travel.148
146
 298 F.2d 11I (1st Cir. 1962) (supra note 17).
147 255 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1958).
148 The advantage of arguing section 302 (b) (1) lies in the judicial recognition of
an over-riding legitimate corporate business purpose, which was basically the taxpayer's
argument. This would he of little help under section 346(a) (2) considering that a
"dividend" ruling was determined by the Treasury Service on the following facts—A
corporation engaged in the business of buying raw skins, tanning and selling the leather
to a certain segment of the leather trade, showed consistent profits up until the last two
years. The demand for the leather suffered a serious, if not a permanent decline. In an effort
to revitalize the business, the corporation changed over to another type of raw skin but losses
continued while inventory accumulated. Because of the depressed market and grim future
prospects, purchases were reduced and inventories liquidated with an eye to complete liquida-
tion if losses continued. Thus, the corporation proposed to redeem a portion of its stock
with cash from the sale of Government bonds and from the proceeds of the inventories
being liquidated in the ordinary course of business. Obviously, we have a legitimate
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Fowler Hosiery Co. v. Commissionerm)—This case not only presents a novel
application of section 346(a) (2), but in supplying a definition to the "re-
quirements of a plan" within the meaning of the section, lends some support
to the taxpayer's argument in Bradbury.
In the instant case, the taxpayer, Fowler Hosiery Co., attempted to
avoid the capital gains treatment afforded a 346(a) (2) distribution. The
taxpayer and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Fowler of Canada, sold all of their
non-fixed assets and leased all of their fixed assets to Kayser and Co. of New
York and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Kayser and Co. of Canada, Ltd., re-
spectively. Subsequent to the transactions, Fowler of Canada distributed
$1,500,000 in dividends to the taxpayer, both corporations treating the dis-
tribution as a dividend to allow the taxpayer to take advantage of a sub-
stantial foreign tax credit under section 902.
The argument advanced in favor of dividend rather than partial liqui-
dation was that the distribution resulted wholly from accumulated earnings
and profits; there was no redemption of all or part of Fowler of Canada's
stock; and that the distribution was not made pursuant to a plan of complete
or partial liquidation adopted by Fowler of Canada on or prior to the date. of
distribution. Thus said the taxpayer, the distribution was essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend.
The court, however, sustained the tax court and the Commissioner's de-
termination that the distribution was received by the taxpayer in partial
liquidation of Fowler of Canada and that it resulted in a long term capital
gain. In adopting the tax court's rationale, the court stated:
The Tax Court acknowledged that 'the distribution to qualify under
Section 346(a)(1) or (2) must be made pursuant to a plan' but
found no statement in the Code or regulations that the plan must
be one so denominated in a formal resolution of the stockholders.
Accordingly, the court held that a 'plan' has been established if the
taxpayer has adopted formally or informally a plan which as a
matter of fact shows itself to constitute a plan of complete liquida-
tion or redemption of a part of the stock. 1"
The court further held that it was immaterial that no stock was actually re-
deemed since the taxpayer was the sole stockholder; its interest in Fowler
of Canada remained the same whether or not any portion of the stock was
retired. Nor does a section 346(a) redemption necessarily require the physi-
cal surrender or cancellation of the stock. The court considered this a ques-
tion of fact, correctly resolved by the tax court in favor of the Commissioner.
business purpose here but a genuine contraction could not be found. Rev. Rul. 60-322,
1960-2 Cum. Bull. 118.
I" 301 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1962).
16° Id. at 397. Also see, Rev. Rul. 59-240, 1959-2, Cum. Bull, 113. The adoption
of a plan of liquidation after a distribution has been made will not qualify the dis-
tribution under section 346. However, where the management characterizes a distribu-
tion as a liquidating dividend by adopting a plan of complete liquidation, and there is
a surrender of stock in connection with such distribution, subsequent modification of the
plan to one which qualifies as a plan of partial liquidation will not cause the previous
distributions to be treated as dividends.
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Additional support for this position can be found in McGregor v. United
States,15 ' a case where a corporation adopted a plan of liquidation of its
wholly-owned construction company and lumber yards located in four states,
but because of the prevailing market, required five years to complete the sale
of these assets. The court held that it was not necessary that there be a
cancellation of stock contemporaneously with each separate distribution in
the series of distributions. A shareholder's stock need not be physically can-
celled until he has been paid in full his amount due in liquidation.
It should also be noted that no attempt was made in these cases to en-
graft a requirement that the transaction must be considered "immediately
after" the distribution as in the Neff case. To the contrary, these cases ex-
pressly negate any such requirement, and since the language of 346(a) (2)
and 302(b) (1) is basically the same, it is arguable that this further rebuffs
the court's interpretation in Neff.
Therefore, considering the paucity of decisions under section 346(a) (2),
if vagueness of application is the reason, it may well be attributed to both
the practicing bar and the judiciary. However, this is not a condemnation by
any means. If a lawyer is to serve the best interests of his client, he would
be highly imprudent to pursue a statutory remedy, the mechanics of which
are shrouded in doubt and uncertainty. If this be the character of the partial
liquidation doctrine, surely the bar in seeking devious remedies should be ex-
horted and not admonished.
But the fact of the matter is, as evidenced by the decided cases, that a
degree of certainty has been injected into the application of section 346
(a) (2). This despite Judge Van Oosterhout in Carey and Professor Bittker's
earlier prophesies of gloom. From Fowler we learn that "pursuant to a plan"
is satisfied if the plan is informal. McGregor informs us that the plan may
take place over a period of years, and from the revenue ruling,'" we know that
it must be in effect prior to the distribution. Furthermore, a more definite
guideline is available if we are willing to apply a literal reading to the fol-
lowing ruling which states:
Where a corporation has earnings available, in order for the distri-
bution of assets by it to its shareholders to be treated as a partial
liquidation, the distribution must result from a genuine contraction
of the business of the corporation. See Joseph V. Imler v. Com-
missioner. • . . 153
Considering that the ruling echoes the language of the Senate Report and is
borne out by the case law, the obvious question, therefore, is why not accept
it? For contained within this ruling, lies the preciseness attempted by the
draftsmen of the 1954 Code, i.e., to merely set apart from the difficult factual
inquiry incident to section 302 (b) (1), one type of redemption which in fact
admits of certainty. Eliminating "contraction" as a factor to be considered
under section 302(b) (1) should facilitate the dividend-determining process.
But as we have seen, this has not been the case and the reason is all too
151
 CCH 1960 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (60-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) 11 9298.
152 Supra note 150.
153 Supra note 148, at 119.
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obvious. The courts and the practicing bar have refused to divorce "con-
traction" from section 302 (b) (1) redemptions. Since more often than not,
the cases are being argued on and decided under section 302, the caveat
that "if . . . the definition of a partial liquidation is achieved, it will be by
the painful process of . . . judicial construction of muddy language" should
more appropriately refer to section 302(b) (1).
However, all of the language in the above mentioned cases has not been
perspicuously penned. The Ballenger court looked for a legitimate contrac-
tion in determining dividend equivalency. The court afforded it "primary
consideration" but stated it was not to be the "sole factor." But note, no-
where in the Senate Report, the revenue rulings or the regulations is cor-
porate contraction considered to be a "factor," that is to say, a "part of the
whole" in determining dividend equivalency. Corporate contraction is the
"whole," the end result of applying the factors enumerated in the Imler case,
quoted above. To say that "corporate contraction" is a factor is to say that
"net effect" is a factor in determining the application of section 302 (b) (1).
Obviously this is wrong, for they are not the means to an end but rather the
end themselves.
Thus the language in Ballenger is no more than a judicial hang-over
from prior case decision. Before the 1954 Code, contraction was but a factor
in determining dividend equivalency under section 115. In its codification,
the draftsmen recognized that contraction was a distinguishable concept, i.e.,
these redemptions took the corporation one step closer to complete liquida-
tion as distinguished from redemptions which merely exhausted accumulated
earnings and profits. The latter find their tax shelter from a determination
that the transaction was in reality a sale. The inquiry is factual, the guide-
lines flexible, but the net effect of the transaction must be a sale and not a
redemption. The former is protected from ordinary income tax treatment be-
cause corporate activity has been reduced by virtue of the assets distributed.
The nature of the inquiry is similar to the latter, but it is directed solely at
an end determination of whether or not there has been a legitimate corporate
contraction.
In the Detailed Discussion of the Bill, the Senate stated, "it is intended
that a genuine contraction of the business as under present law will result in
partial liquidation.""4 However, this does not mean that all of the present
judicial language dealing with contraction shall be carried forward as implied
in Ballenger. This is because the context of contraction has been altered for it is
no longer considered merely a factor in dividend equivalency. 'What is meant is
that those cases in which a genuine contraction has been determined shall
hereafter act as a guide in the factual inquiry incident to the application of
346(a)(2).
The misunderstanding in Ballenger was the same misinterpretation that
led one writer to remark:
It is very doubtful if the contours of a contraction test can be pre-
scribed with any measure of success. But even if we assume that we
154 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83 Cong., 2d Sess. 262; 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4899
(1954).
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can define "contraction," what is its relevance? By hypothesis the
corporation has accumulated profits and is distributing cash repre-
senting some of these profits. The corporation does not intend to
conclude its existence, for the distribution is not one of a series of
distributions in complete liquidation of the corporation. The share-
holders remain as shareholders, their initial investment is still in-
tact, and their relationship to the corporation and each other has
not been altered. In such a setting, the distribution of cash should
be treated for what it is—a distribution of profits. The activity at
the corporate level which produced the cash and the motivation be-
hind its distribution are not matters which should affect this con-
clusion."'
This misses the point. If the transaction is merely "a distribution of profits,"
it is a dividend regardless of the fact that it was initiated at the corporate
level. Bradbury and Neff are poignant examples. As for mere distributions
of accumulated profits without more, the Senate, in the Detailed Discussion
of the Bill, explained that such a "distribution of a reserve for expansion is
not a partial liquidation."'" What the writer describes is the Carey trans-
action where there was merely a contraction of capital and not a contraction
of corporate activity, but as we have seen, the Carey case was not decided
under 346(a) (2)—it is not precedent in this area (nor should it be consid-
ered precedent under section 302 (b) (1)). On the other hand, Fowler is
typical of what the legislature had in mind, as are the very restrictive revenue
rulings.'" The search is directed toward the finding of reduced corporate ac-
tivity as determined by the assets distributed, for as Professor Bittker states:
The emphasis on the nature of the assets distributed, as a test
of partial liquidation, leaves little room for distributions that do not
result from corporate contractions, since only in the case of corpo-
rate contractions has it been thought that the nature of the distrib-
uted assets was an important element in determining whether the
distribution was essentially equivalent to a dividend. It is not likely
therefore, that section 346(a) (2) will be satisfied by distributions
that do not reflect a corporate contraction."'
CONCLUSION
It is fair to say that a determination as to whether or not a corporate
distribution is essentially equivalent to a taxable dividend presents, to this
day, a perplexing problem. This is not to say that the problem is irremedial;
for within the Treasury Regulations, the Revenue Rulings and, more impor-
tantly, the decided cases, rest ample criteria for resolution. Moreover, the
present status is more directly a result of the language in the Senate Report.
Stating that the tests to be applied in these determinations are "generally"
155 Cohen, A Technical Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Corpo-
rate Distributions to Shareholders, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 37-38 (1952).
156 Supra note 154.
15T Supra note 148.
158 Bittker, Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations Under the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 13, 23 (1956).
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or "primarily" those presently applied, has resulted in wholesale importation
of pre-1954 Code decisional language, much of which is incompatible with
the legislative purpose of separating partial liquidations from redemptions.
A weeding out process is required, but this will not begin until a saturation
point is reached which will enable the judiciary and the bar to mold their
opinions and their arguments exclusively from 1954 Code-decisional law.
When that point is reached, a section 302 (b) (1) determination will direct
itself solely towards a strict net effect test. In the interests of uniformity,
the test will be a weighted test for the inquiry will remain factual in nature.
As such, some factors will necessitate more favorable consideration within the
context of the particular case.
A business purpose for the redemption which gives the transaction its
sale-like qualities, will be a factor among other factors. Unnecessary is the
distinction between "strict net effect" and "net effect with an overriding busi-
ness purpose." This merely fosters subtle language whose meaning is incident
only to the particular case but which has a tendency of reappearing as a true
rule as in Bradbury.'" Permitting a legitimate business purpose to prevail
despite a concurrent tax avoidance motive (which was the Carey case although
the court was reluctant to say so) can more properly be treated within a net
effect test. Therefore, afford the "business purpose" its due weight and con-
clude that, all factors considered, the transaction was a sale and not a redemp-
tion in contra-distinction to the doctrine of vicarious taxation introduced by the
court in Carey.'" After all, a legitimate business purpose in these cases is no
more than a legitimate use for the stock redeemed, to wit a plan. Neff ,161-
Carey' 62 and especially Decker1 °3 are indicative of the types of plans involved.
Thus conceding the business purpose or plan in a 302 (b) (1) inquiry, we neces-
sarily must look at the motive for the distribution, i.e., the corporate purpose.
Here again we run afoul of the Senate Report for there we are urged to view
the transaction solely at the shareholder level. 76" This is impossible as evi-
denced by the total acceptance of business purpose in the decided cases, 105
thus, we can say that this has already been weeded out.
The virtual conclusive presumptionn° of dividend equivalency now af-
forded pro rata or substantially pro rata distributions is warranted, but far
too often it is overly stated as in Bradbury. The pro rata effect of the dis-
tribution, like business purpose, is a factor to be considered. In a Brad-
bury' 67 or Neffl" situation, it should be given considerable weight whereas
166 See text to supra note 17.
160 See text to supra note 42.
161 See text to supra note 32 (corporation needed capital and nobody would pur-
chase from Neff).
162 Supra note 160 (shift in stock ownership to benefit the corporation).
163 See text to supra note 69 (purchase of stock for resale to key employees). See
also text to supra note 77.
104 Text to supra note 10.
165 Ballenger court summarizes the decided cases placing them into categories—net
effect in which business purpose is a factor and net effect with an overriding business
purpose. See text to supra note 49.
166 See discussion in Ballenger v. United States, text to supra note 49.
167 Supra note 159 (substantially pro rata as a result of attribution of stock among
family members enjoying a close friendly relationship).
168 Supra note 161 (sole stockholder situation).
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in a Lewis'° or Parkerl" situation, it should be cautiously applied.
A further prominent factor to be considered in any net effect test is
whether or not the taxpayer actually received an "economic benefit" or a
"taxable gain." Since this factor was developed under the 1954 Code-case
law,' 71
 it will be worthy of future consideration for it also affords the court
another opportunity to view the distribution at the shareholder level. In view
of the latter, it is expressly sanctioned by the Senate Report. The force of
this factor lies in the fact that the conditional language of section 115, "at
such time and in such manner," was discarded in the drafting of the 1954
Code, thus permitting the court complete freedom in looking through the
form of the transaction to the substance.'"
Contraction, long an important consideration in dividend equivalency
has no place in present determinations despite the fact that the 1954 Code
decisions abound with such language. Again, this is nothing more than an
improper carry-over of the decisional law under the 1939 Code. Surely time,
and the beneficial recognition that 302(b) (1) determinations will be facili-
tated by discarding considerations of corporate contraction, will effect a
remedy. Corporate activity is and will continue to be viewed from the
standpoint of business purpose, not contraction, within this area of dividend
equivalency.
Contraction, then, is but one type of redemption which Congress intends
to be individually examined. As such it shall continue to be narrowly viewed,
and its tests, rigidly applied. For this reason not all contractions will incur
the favor of 346(a) (2). A contraction of the capital structure, or a re-
duction of inventory, where the corporate activity is not simultaneously re-
duced, will result in dividend equivalency. This, regardless of whether or
not the distribution is pursuant to a plan, informal or formal, and whether
or not the stock is simultaneously cancelled or redeemed. The primary
346(a) (2) consideration is the nature of the assets distributed as opposed
to a 302(b) (1) determination which requires that the net effect of the
transaction resembles a sale.
This is not to say that corporate contractions which fail the tests of
346(a) (2) may not still find shelter under 302(b) (1). The regulations are
not too explicit on this point, requiring only that the former must govern
when both are applicable. However, both Ballenger and Carey, as strong
precedent, indicate a judicial willingness to decide the cases under 302(b) (1)
when the net effect of the transaction compels such a result despite the
undercurrent of 346(a) (2). In these cases, the contraction in and of itself
is not significant. Rather, it is the corporate activity which motivated the
contraction that both nurtures the business purpose and encourages a
160 See text to supra note I11 (double application of section 318, estate—benefi-
ciaries of the estate—spouse of the beneficiaries, which resulted in virtual pro rata dis-
tribution).
170
 Sec text to supra note 116 (dissension among stockholders whose stock is to be
attributed).
171
 See the rationale of Decker v. Commissioner, supra note 69, and the cases fol-
lowing within the "Discharge of Indebtedness" section.
172 See the discussion in Decker v. Commissioner, supra note 69, and Aloysius J.
McGinty, supra note 93.
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302(b) (1) finding. The concepts are separate and distinguishable and even-
tually will be so recognized. Surely the courts cannot continue indefinitely
their present practice of alluding to "contraction" in a 302(b) (1) deter-
mination but never discussing it.
Nor will the practicing bar continue to avoid the alleged uncertainties of
legitimate corporate contraction, if in fact the contraction is legitimate, in
favor of the more flexible 302(b)(1). This is especially true in cases involv-
ing constructive ownership of stock which renders the distribution virtually
pro rata. Judicial expression is so firmly entrenched that the weight afforded
a pro rata distribution will not lessen with time. Since the attribution rules
do not apply to 346(a) (2), a further hard look at this section should be ex-
pected from the practicing bar in the future. If we interpret Bradbury as a
warning that Carey decisions will be few and far between, this "hard look"
may be close at hand—and a rash of section 346(a) (2) decisions may just be
that "weeding" force.
JOHN R. MURPHY
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